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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
tion 1963 is not prejudicial to either creditors or debtors.' In addition,
methods to curb abuses of the appellate process resulting from a strict
interpretation of section 1963 exist within the delegated powers of the
appellate courts." If Congress would amend section 1963 to permit a
creditor's registration of judgment in a foreign district upon a debtor's
failure to file a supersedeas bond, Congress would eradicate the problem
of a local debtor who abuses section 1963 by filing frivolous appeals and
then removing property from the judgment district without filing a
supersedeas bond.8 5 Making the debtor's filing of a supersedeas bond a
requirement under section 1963 is an inadequate solution to the problem
caused by the debtor intent on abusing section 1963 to escape debt
obligations." Interpreting section 1963 as requiring a bond raises more.
complex problems involving a later reversal of the original judgment
and the potential for collateral attack on the judgment executed in the
foreign district. 7 By ignoring the express language of section 1963, the
Fourth Circuit has overstepped judicial bounds in an attempt to solve a
problem that proper application of the appellate court's power could
resolve more easily.'
ROBERT S. PARKER
IV. CIvIL RIGHTS & EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
A. Allocation of Burdens of Proof in ADEA Litigation
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)1 prohibits
employers from discriminating on the basis of age against employees
See supra note 47 (majority of courts find § 1963 constitutional).
See supra text accompanying notes 76-81 (methods available to courts to prevent
debtors from abusing § 1963).
f. 33 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1571 (by not requiring supersedeas bond under
§ 1963, Congress allows debtors to abuse appellate process).
," See infra text accompanying note 88 (interpreting § 1963 as requiring bond creates
problems of later reversal of the cases and collateral attack).
" See Kaplan v. Hirsh, 91 F.R.D. 106, 109 (D. Md. 1981) (Congress intended § 1963 to
apply only to judgment final by appeal since no danger exists of later reversal and collateral
attacks are limited).
"8 Accord 33 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1576 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (if Con-
stitution vested the appellate court with legislative powers, the dissent would concur with
the majority).
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The predecessor of the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act (ADEA) was an executive order by President Lyndon Johnson pro-
hibiting age discrimination by government contractors. See Exec. Order No. 11,141, 29 Fed.
Reg. 2477 (1964) (express policy of federal government is to promote employment decisions
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between 40 and 70 years of age.2 Congress enacted the ADEA to insure
that employers make employment decisions on objective evaluations of
employees' job performances, rather than on misconceptions about the
ability and age of elderly employees.' The ADBA provides legal and
equitable remedies for employees who have suffered unfavorable
employment actions because of age discrimination. An ADEA plaintiff
on basis of merit rather than age). The ADEA is the product of a 1965 report by the Depart-
ment of Labor that examined the impact of age discrimination on the working force. See
U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 18-19 (1965) (older workers denied fifty
percent of private job openings because of age discrimination). The Department of Labor's
study prompted President Johnson to recommend legislation to prohibit age discrimination.
See President's Message to Congress Proposing Increases in Social Security Payments and
Extending Other Benefits, 3 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. DOC. 75, 81 (Jan. 30, 1967) (recommend-
ing age discrimination legislation because of serious economic and psychological problems
caused by age discrimination). Twenty-three states had laws prohibiting age discrimination
at the time of President Johnson's message. Id. Congress utilized the experiences of the 23
states that had age discrimination legislation, the President's Message, and the Department
of Labor's report to enact legislation prohibiting age discrimination. See AGE DISCRIMINA-
TION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967, H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4, reprinted in
1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2213, 2214-15 (ADEA intended to promote employment
of older workers on basis of workers' abilities).
2 See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1976). The ADEA provides that an employer may not
refuse to hire, discharge, or discriminate against any individual because of an individual's
agf. Id.; see Reeves v. General Foods Corp., 682 F.2d 515, 524-25 (5th Cir. 1982) (age
digcharge illegal); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1112 (4th Cir.) (age demotion
illegal), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 560 (1981); Hodgson v. First Fed. Sav. and Loan, 455 F.2d 818,
825 (5th Cir. 1972) (refusal to hire because of age illegal); Hodgson v. Sugar Cane Growers
Coop., 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8618, at 7813, 5 Fair Employ. Prac. Cas. 1136, 1138 (S.D.
Fla. 1973) (forcing harder workload on elderly employee to encourage employee to retire is
illegal); Hodgson v. American Hardware Mut. Bus. Co., 329 F. Supp. 225, 229 (D. Minn. 1971)
(requiring elderly employee to retire involuntarily is illegal).
Originally the ADEA only protected individuals between the ages of 40 and 65. See 29
U.S.C. § 631(a) (1976) (amended by 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). In 1978, Con-
gress raised the upper limit of the protected age bracket to 70 years of age. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 631(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981; see also S.R. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 7, reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 504, 510 (raising age limit of ADEA to 70 protects
large number of elderly employees that face mandatory retirement and wish to continue
working).
' See 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The purpose of the ADEA is to pro-
mote employment decisions based on ability rather than age and to prohibit arbitrary age
discrimination in employment. Id.; see S. REP. No. 493, 95th CONG., 2ND SESS. 3, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 504, 506 (Congress enacted ADEA to insure that
employees); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1236 (3d Cir. 1977) (Congress intended
see also Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, 579 F.2d 107, 109 (1st Cir. 1978) (Congress enacted
ADEA to eradicate misconceptions concerning age and working ability of elderly
employees); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1236 (3rd Cir. 1977) (Congress intended
ADEA to ensure that employers base employment decisions on performance rather than
age), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978).
' See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976) (court can grant any legal or equitable relief ap-
propriate to effectuate ADEA's purpose). The remedies that the ADEA allows courts to
award include preliminary and permanent injunctions, reinstatement, promotion, and back
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must prove that age was a determining factor in an adverse employment
decision.' ADEA plaintiffs, however, usually are unable to provide direct
evidence of an employer's discriminatory intent.' Courts, therefore, per-
mit ADEA plaintiffs to prove discriminatory intent with circumstantial
evidence.7 Generally, to facilitate plaintiffs' ability to prove
pay. Id. A court may also award liquidated damages if a plaintiff proves that an employer
willfully violated the Act. Id.; see Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 154
(7th Cir. 1981) (liquidated damages equal back pay and benefits denied elderly employee by
employer).
' See 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1) (1976) (employer cannot discharge or demote plaintiff because
of plaintiffs age). The majority of courts hold that a plaintiff proves a violation of the ADEA
by demonstrating that the plaintiffs age was a determining factor in an adverse employ-
mdnt decision. See Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109,1112 (4th Cir.) (plaintiff proves
ADEA violation by showing age was determining factor in employment decision), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1035 (2d Cir. 1980) (plaintiff
must show age was determining factor by proving that plaintiffs age made difference in
employment action), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 445 (1981); see also S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 7 (1967) (purpose of ADEA is to insure that age is not determining factor in
employment decisions). But see Reed v. Shell Oil Co., 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Case (BNA) 875,
878 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (employer violates ADEA by showing age was one factor in employ-
ment decision); Coates v. National Cash Register, 433 F. Supp. 655, 660 (W.D. Va. 1977)
(plaintiff proves ADEA violation by showing age was one reason for adverse employment
decision). An employer can avoid liability in an ADEA action by proving one of the
statutory defenses included in the Act. See 29 U.S.C. 623(f) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (statutory
defenses). For example, the ADEA allows an employer to demote or discharge an elderly
employee for good cause. See id. § 623(f)(3) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); see also Houser v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 627 F.2d 756, 759 (5th Cir. 1980) (loss of confidence in employee); Simmons v.
McGuffey Nursing Home, 619 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir. 1980) (poor work performance and
strained relations with stockholders); Kerwood v. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, 494 F. Supp.
1298, 1309 (D.D.C. 1980) (inability to adjust to new superior's zeal); Peterson v. Colonial
Stores, 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 725, 726 (N.D. Ga. 1978) (pilot drinking between
flights); Bittar v. Air Canada, 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1136, 1136-37 (S.D. Fla. 1974)
(derelection of duty). See generally Note, Striking a Balance Between The Interests of
Public Safety and The Rights of Older Workers; The Age BFOQ Defense, 39 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1371, 1371-95 (1982) (examination of bonafide occupational qualification exception to
ADEA). An employer can also avoid liability in an ADEA action by simply showing that age
was not a factor in a plaintiffs discharge or demotion. See Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510
F.2d 307, 313 (6th Cir. 1975) (discharge of elderly employee as part of reduction in work
force does not violate ADEA). Generally, courts will not examine the correctness of a
employment decision as long as age is not a factor in the decision. See Parcinski v. Outlet
Co., 673 F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 1982) (ADEA does not authorize courts to judge wisdom of cor-
poration's business decisions); Kephart v. Institute of Gas Technology, 630 F.2d 1217, 1223
(7th Cir. 1980) (Congress did not intend ADEA to be vehicle for judicial review of business
decisions), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981).
' See Stock v. Horsman Dolls, Inc., 27 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 32,275, at 22,922, 27
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1423, 1425 (D.S.C. 1981) (ADEA plaintiffs rarely present direct
evidence of age discrimination).
' See Reeves v. General Foods Corp., 682 F.2d 515, 524-25 (5th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff
relied on evidence showing that defendant tended to discriminate against elderly
employees); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1033 (2d Cir. 1980) (plaintiff relied on
statistics to prove discriminatory intent), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 445 (1981); Marshall v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1977) (plaintiff used evidence in-
dicating that employer discriminated against others in plaintiffs age group).
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discriminatory intent with circumstantial evidence, courts allocate
burdens of proof between plaintiffs and defendants.' Courts use proof
schemes to allocate the burdens of proof in ADEA cases in order to nar-
row the issue into whether an employer's explanation for an employ-
ment action or a plaintiff's claim of age discrimination is the true reason
for the employment action.' The proof scheme used by the Fourth Cir-
cuit in Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 0 and by the majority of other
courts," is ineffective because the proof scheme does not narrow the
dispositive issue in ADEA cases." Because the United States Supreme
Court has not formulated a proof scheme dictating the evidentiary
burdens on plaintiffs and defendants in ADEA actions," lower courts
have been unable to achieve consistent allocation of burdens of proof in
ADEA actions."
The majority of courts use a three-stage proof scheme to allocate the
burdens of production and persuasion in ADEA cases. A burden of pro-
' See Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1239 (3d Cir. 1977) (courts enforce ADEA by
means of evidentiary rules that facilitate plaintiffs' proof of employers' discriminatory pur-
pose), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); see also Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in
Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1205, 1208
(1981) (courts recognize that proper allocation of burdens of proof is necessary to effectuate
discrimination legislation because of difficulties that plaintiffs' have in producing direct
evidence).
' See Cline v. Roadway, 689 F.2d 481, 485 (4th Cir. 1982) (purpose of proof scheme is to
narrow motivational issue in ADEA cases); see also Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981) (proof scheme sharpens inquiry into elusive question of
intentional discrimination).
10 681 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1982).
" See infra notes 15-21 and accompanying text (explanation of three-stage proof
scheme that majority of courts use in ADEA cases).
12 See infra text accompanying notes 135-143 (ADEA proof scheme does not focus in-
quiry into whether discriminatory intent motivated employer to treat plaintiff unfavorably).
13 See Blakeboro, Allocation of Proof in ADEA Cases: A Critique of the Prima Facie
Approach, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 90, 98 (1980) (Supreme Court has not decided how ADEA plain-
tiffs prove discriminatory intent with circumstantial evidence). The Supreme Court primarily
has addressed procedural issues in the few ADEA cases the Court has decided. See Oscar-
Meyer Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 757 (1979) (plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies
before instituting ADEA action in federal court); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 585 (1978)
(jury trial available in ADEA actions). But see United Air Lines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192,
195 (1977) (ADEA does not invalidate bonafide retirement plans instituted before Congress
enacted ADEA).
" See Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730, 735 (5th Cir. 1977) (lower
court opinions evidence considerable confusion about allocation of evidentiary burdens in
ADEA cases); Note Civil Rights- Use of Direct Evidence to Establish A Prima Facie Case
of Age Discrimination Under the ADEA Obviates Need to Make Independent Showing of
Pretext- Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 59, 59 (1981) (confusion ex-
ists about how courts should allocate burdens of proof in ADEA cases).
"5 See Golomb v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 688 F.2d 547,-551 (7th Cir. 1982) (proof
scheme helps ADEA plaintiff show that plaintiff suffered unfavorable treatment because of
plaintiff's age); Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 531-33 (9th Cir. 1981) (proof scheme
enables plaintiff to prove discriminatory motive with circumstantial evidence); Loeb v. Tex-
[Vol. 40:459
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duction places an obligation on a party to present sufficient evidence to
raise a genuine issue of fact.16 A burden of persuasion places an obliga-
tion on a party to prove a fact at issue." The majority of courts using the
three-stage proof scheme require plaintiffs to establish a prima facie
case of age discrimination. 8 A prima facie case of age discrimination con-
sists of facts that, absent a contrary explanation by an employer, allow a
trier of fact to infer that an employer treated a plaintiff unfavorably
because of the plaintiff's age."9 When a plaintiff establishes a prima facie
tron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014-15 (1st Cir. 1979) (allocation of evidentiary burdens assists
ADEA plaintiff in proving employer's discriminatory intent).
,1 See Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 533 (9th Cir. 1981) (party carries production
burden by raising question of fact for resolution by trier of fact). A party that has the
burden of production on an element at issue must introduce sufficient evidence to allow a
trier of fact to act upon the element. Id.; see Belton, supra note 8, at 1216 (party carries pro-
duction burden by introducing enough evidence to preclude directed verdict). If a party fails
to carry the burden of production on an element, then a judge must remove the element
from the trier of fact's consideration. Id.
" See Smith & Leggette, Recent Issues in Litigation Under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, 41 OHIO STATE L.J. 349, 374 (1980). The burden of persuasion allocates
the risk of loss if a trier of fact cannot reach a conclusion about an element at issue. Id. If a
trier of fact can decide an issue in either the plaintiffs favor or the defendant's favor, then
the trier of fact must decide against the party with the burden of persuasion. Id.
" See Reeves v. General Foods Corp., 682 F.2d 515, 520 (5th Cir. 1982) (ADEA plaintiff
must simply establish prima facie case); Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 533 n.5 (9th Cir.
1981) (ADEA plaintiff need only produce evidence of elements of prima facie case);
Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1239 (3d Cir. 1977) (ADEA plaintiff carries production
burden by presenting prima facie case), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 193 (1978). But see Halsell v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 683 F.2d 285, 290 (8th Cir. 1982) (ADEA plaintiff has burden of prov-
ing prima facie case by preponderance of evidence). The majority of courts require an
ADEA plaintiff to prove a prima facie case of age discrimination by showing that the plain-
tiff was between 40 and 70 years of age, that the plaintiff possessed minimal qualifications
for a job that the plaintiff sought, that an employer chose not to employ the plaintiff, and
that the employer filled the job position with someone else. See Garner v. Boorstin, 690 F.2d
1034, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (most courts require ADEA plaintiffs to establish prima facie
case of age discrimination by proving four elements); Halsell v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 683
F.2d 285, 289 (8th Cir. 1982) (most circuit courts require ADEA plaintiffs to prove four
criteria for prima facie case). The majority of courts recognize, however, that the elements
that a plaintiff must prove to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination vary accord-
ing to the facts of each case. See Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 550 F.2d 1113, 1114 (8th
Cir. 1977) (proof necessary to establish prima facie case is different in each ADEA case); see
also Equal Employment Opportunity Comm. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 544 F. Supp.
1187, 1218-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (court establishes different types of prima facie cases for
members of class alleging age discrimination).
See Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1981) (proof of prima facie case
of age discrimination establishes inference of unlawful discrimination); see also Furnco Constr.
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1977). In Furnco, the Supreme Court reversed a lower
court decision because the lower court equated a prima facie showing with a finding of fact
about an employer's discriminatory intent. Id. The Supreme Court held that a prima facie
case is not the same thing as a finding that discriminatory intent motivated an employer. Id.
The Furnco Court stated that proof of a prima facie case raises an inference of discrimina-
tion because the disputed employment action, unless otherwise explained, is more likely
1983]
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case of age discrimination, the majority of courts hold that a burden of
production shifts to the defendant to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie
case by establishing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
challenged employment action. 0 All courts that use the three-stage proof
scheme hold that if the defendant carries the rebuttal burden, then the
plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defend-
ant's explanation for the employment action is actually a pretext for age
discrimination.2 ,
The three-stage proof scheme that courts use when ADEA plaintiffs
rely on circumstantial evidence to prove an employer's discriminatory
intent is an adaptation of the proof guidelines that the Supreme Court
developed for cases involving Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VII). Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis
than not based upon consideration of impermissible factors. Id. at 577; see Belton, supra
note 8, at 1222 (inference is conclusion that trier of fact can reasonably draw from facts).
21 See Cline v. Roadway, 689 F.2d 481, 485 (4th Cir. 1982) (ADEA defendant's burden
to dispell prima facie case is relatively light burden of production); Parcinski v. Outlet Co.,
673 F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 1982) (employer only has to present legitimate reason for employ-
ment action to discharge production burden); Haring v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 664 F.2d 1234, 1237
(5th Cir. 1981) (ADEA defendant's burden is to offer nondiscriminatory reason for employ-
ment action). But see Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 550 F.2d 1113, 1114 (8th Cir. 1977)
(employer has burden of proof to justify action on basis other than age); Marshall v. Arlene
Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715, 728 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (defendant has burden of proving ex-
istence of nondiscriminatory reason for challenged employment action), modified, 605 F.2d
1369 (2d Cir. 1979).
21 See Kephart v. Institute of Gas Technology, 630 F.2d 1217, 1222 (7th Cir. 1980)
(plaintiff has burden of proving that employer's explanation is-pretext for discrimination),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981); Smithers v. Bailar, 629 F.2d 892, 898 (3d Cir. 1980) (plaintiff
proves pretext by showing age was determinative factor in employer's employment decision).
' See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VII) prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex,
religion, or national origin. See id. § 2000e-2(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). A plaintiff in a Title
VII action may sue for damages under either the disparate impact theory of discrimination
or the disparate treatment theory of discrimination. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 325 n.15 (1977) (comparing disparate impact and disparate treat-
ment theories of Title VII discrimination). A disparate impact claim involves facially neutral
employment practices that effectively treat one class of employees more harshly than any
other class of employees. Id. A disparate treatment claim, however, involves an employer
intentionally treating one class of employees less favorably than other classes because of
the employees' race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Id. A major difference between
the disparate impact theory and the disparate treatment theory is that proof of
discriminatory motive is necessary in a disparate treatment claim, while proof of
discriminatory motive is unnecessary in a disparate impact claim. Id. Compare Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971) (absence of discriminatory intent does not ab-
solve employer from liability under disparate impact theory) with McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-06 (1973) (plaintiff must prove employer motivated by
discriminatory intent in disparate treatment case). Under both the disparate treatment
theory and the disparate impact theory, a Title VII defendant must produce a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action in order to dispell a plain-
tiffs prima facie case of discrimination. See Fourth Circuit Review- Standards of Proof in
Title VI Litigation, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 645, 646 nn.7-8 (1981) (Title VII defendant has
[Vol. 40:459
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of race, sex, color, religion, or national origin.' The majority of courts
reason that the Title VII proof guidelines are appropriate in ADEA
litigation because the language of the ADEA is almost identical to the
language of Title VII.24 The majority of courts also reason that the Title
VII proof guidelines are appropriate in ADEA cases because of the
similar evidentiary difficulties that plaintiffs encounter in both ADEA
cases and Title VII cases.'
The Supreme Court first addressed the allocation of proof in a Title
VII case in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green." In McDonnell Douglas,
the Court stated that a Title VII plaintiff that relies on circumstantial
evidence to prove an employer's discriminatory intent must first
establish a prima facie case of discriminationY The McDonnell Douglas
burden of production to rebut both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims). A ma-
jority of courts hold that the Supreme Court's proof guidelines for both Title VII disparate
treatment and disparate impact cases are adaptable to ADEA cases. See Geller v.
Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980) (disparate impact), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 455
(1981); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014-15 (1st Cir. 1979) (disparate treatment);
Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730, 735 (5th Cir. 1977) (disparate treat-
ment). But see Lindsey v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 1123, 1124, 1124 n.3 (5th Cir.
1977) (applicability of Title VII proof guidelines in ADEA actions remains unclear);
Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 311 (6th Cir. 1975) (courts should not apply Title
VII proof guidelines automatically to ADEA jury trials).
" See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (unlawful employment practice to
discriminate against employee because of employee's race, gender, color, religion, or na-
tional origin); H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2391, 2401 (Congress enacted Title VI to eliminate arbitrary discrimination in
workplace).
2 See 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1) (1976) (unlawful employment practice to discriminate against
an employee because of employee's age); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)
(unlawful employment practice to discriminate against an employee because of employee's
race, gender, color, religion, or national origin); see also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584
(1978) (Congress derived ADEA directly from Title VII).
See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1015 (1st Cir. 1979) (plaintiffs in both Title
VII and ADEA cases usually are unable to produce direct evidence of discriminatory
intent). Compare Gates v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 326 F. Supp. 397, 398-99 (D. Or. 1970)
(direct evidence of discriminatory intent in Title VII case is virtually impossible to produce),
affd, 492 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1974) with Stock v. Horsman Dolls, Inc., 27 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 32,275 at 22,922, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1423, 1425 (D.S.C. 1981) (ADEA
plaintiffs rarely present direct evidence of discriminatory motivation).
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
' Id. at 802. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Supreme Court established
proof guidelines for Title VII disparate treatment cases. Id. at 802-06. The McDonnell
Douglas Court said that a plaintiff in a race discrimination case must first prove a prima
facie case of discrimination by showing that the plaintiff was a member of a minority race,
that the plaintiff sought a job for which plaintiff possessed sufficient qualifications, that the
employer chose not to employ the plaintiff despite the plaintiffs qualifications, and that
after the employer rejected the plaintiff, the position remained available to others with
similar qualifications. Id. at 802. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of race
discrimination, then the employer must rebut the plaintiffs prima facie case by articulating
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the disputed employment action. Id. at 802-03.
The McDonnell Douglas Court stated that if a defendant produces a legitimate, non-
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Court determined that the plaintiff proved a prima facie case of race
discrimination by showing that the plaintiff was of a minority race, that
the plaintiff possessed sufficient qualifications for the desired job, and
that the defendant refused to employ the plaintiff despite the plaintiff's
qualifications. 8 The McDonnell Douglas Court stated that proof of a
prima facie case shifts a burden of production to the defendant to pro-
vide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for treating the plaintiff un-
favorably. 9 The Court held that once a defendant provides a non-
discriminatory explanation for the employment action, then the plaintiff
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's ex-
planation is actually a pretext for discrimination.2
In subsequent Title VII cases the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines. 1 Lower courts, however, applied
the McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines inconsistently32 because the
Court did not provide a clear explanation of how a Title VII defendant
rebuts a plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination.2 3 The majority of
the circuit courts held that a Title VII defendant rebuts a plaintiff's
prima facie case by simply producing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the challenged employment action. 4 A minority of circuit
discriminatory explanation for the employment action, then the plaintiff must show that the
employer's reason for the adverse employment action is a pretext for discrimination. Id. at
804; see International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 432 U.S. 333, 358 (1977) (McDon-
nell Douglas proof guidelines are flexible).
' See 411 U.S. at 802. In McDonnell Douglas, the Court stated that the elements of a
prima facie case will vary according to the circumstances of each case. Id. at 802 n.13.
See id. at 802-03 (respondent's participation in unlawful activities against defendant
constituted legitimate reason for defendant's refusal to hire).
See id. at 803 (lower court must afford plaintiff opportunity to prove defendant's ex-
planation is pretext for discrimination).
31 See Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 24-25 (1978)
(lower court misapplied McDonnell Douglas by requiring defendant to prove non-
discriminatory reason for employment action); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567, 575 (1978) (McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines govern Title VII disparate treatment
cases).
' See Fourth Circuit Review-Allocation of Burdens of Proof and Persuasion in
Disparate Treatment Case of Title VII Litigation, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 637, 639 (1982)
(lower courts have applied Title VII proof guidelines inconsistently); infra notes 34-35 and
accompanying text (lower courts' inconsistent application of McDonnell Douglas proof
guidelines).
See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1012 (1st Cir. 1979) (Supreme Court created
confusion about defendant's burden under McDonnell Douglas). Compare Board of Trustees
of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 n.2 (1978) (Title VII defendant rebuts
plaintiffs prima facie case by producing evidence of nondiscriminatory reason for employ-
ment action) with Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (defendant rebuts
plaintiffs prima facie case by proving nondiscriminatory reason for employment decision).
See Wright v. National Archives and Records Serv., 609 F.2d 702, 715-16 (4th Cir.
1979) (Title VII defendant rebuts plaintiffs prima facie case by producing nondiscriminatory
reason for employment action); Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150, 1156 (2d Cir.)
(employer rebuts plaintiffs prima facie case by articulating nondiscriminatory reason for
[Vol. 40:459
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
courts held that a Title VII defendant rebuts a prima facie case by prov-
ing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employ-
ment action.' In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,"
the Supreme Court resolved the differences between the circuit courts
about a Title VII defendant's rebuttal burden and held that a Title VII
defendant's rebuttal burden is a burden of production. 7
In determining the proper evidentiary standard for a Title VII
defendant, the Burdine Court clarified the proof guidelines for a Title
VII bench trial.' The Burdine Court modified the McDonnell Douglas
proof guidelines by stating that a plaintiff's initial burden of proving a
prima facie case amounts to a burden of persuasion that the plaintiff
meets by a preponderance of the evidence. 9 The Burdine Court expanded
the McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines and held that proof of a prima
facie case of discrimination creates a mandatory, rebuttable presumption
of discrimination." A rebuttable presumption of discrimination compels
employment action), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984 (1978; Harper v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
525 F.2d 409, 411 (8th Cir. 1975) (employer has burden of presenting acceptable and
legitimate business reasons for challenged employment practice).
I See Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251, 1255 (5th Cir. 1977) (employer
bears burden of proving that nondiscriminatory reason motivated employment action);
Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394, 399 (3d Cir. 1976) (employer must prove
nondiscriminatory reason for employment action), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); Ran-
dolph v. United States Elevator Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1120, 1124 (S.D. Fla. 1978) (defendant's
rebuttal burden in Title VII case is burden of persuasion).
450 U.S. 248 (1981).
See id. at 254 (Title VII defendant only bears burden of producing nondiscriminatory
reason for defendant's employment action). In Burdine, a female employee of the Texas
Department of Community Affairs (TDCA) claimed that TDCA failed to promote her, and
subsequently fired her, because she was a woman. Id. at 251. The Fifth Circuit held that
TDCA violated Title VII because TDCA did not prove a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for Burdine's termination. See Burdine v. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs, 608
F.2d 563, 567-68 (5th Cir. 1979) (Title VII defendant's rebuttal burden is burden of persuasion),
vacated, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). On appeal from the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court determined
that the Fifth Circuit misconstrued McDonnell Douglas in determining the evidentiary
burden required for the rebuttal of a prima facie case of gender discrimination. 450 U.S. at
256. The Burdine Court held that a Title VII defendant rebuts a prima facie case of
discrimination by producing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the disputed employ-
ment action. Id. at 259-60.
' See Reeves v. General Foods Corp., 682 F.2d 515, 520-22 (5th Cir. 1982) (Burdine
Court clarified proper application of McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines).
" See 450 U.S. at 252-53. The Burdine Court's holding that a plaintiff must prove a
prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence is inconsistent with the Court's earlier
Title VII cases. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1977) (plaintiff
establishes prima facie case by showing elements of prima face case); see also Board of
Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(plaintiff in Title VII action bears initial burden of presenting evidence sufficient to
establish prima facie case of discrimination).
'o See 450 U.S. at 254 & 254 n.9 (establishment of prima facie case creates mandatory
presumption that employer unlawfully discriminated against employee). A mandatory,
rebuttable presumption requires a trier of fact to draw certain inferences from the facts
1983]
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a trier of fact to draw an inference of discrimination from the plaintiff's
prima facie case.41 The Burdine Court stated that the rebuttable
presumption shifts a burden of production to the defendant.42 The Court
determined that the defendant carries the burden of production and
rebuts the presumption of discrimination by producing a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the challenged employment action. 3
The Burdine Court found that the defendant carries the burden of
production by introducing just enough evidence to raise a genuine issue
of material fact about whether discriminatory intent motivated the
defendant to treat the plaintiff unfavorably.4  The Burdine Court deter-
mined that if the defendant rebuts the presumption by carrying the
burden of production, then the presumption disappears and the legally
mandatory inference of discrimination that arises from the plaintiff's
prima facie case no longer exists. 45 The Supreme Court stated that once
the defendant rebuts the presumption, then the plaintiff must have an
opportunity to persuade the trier of fact that the defendant's explana-
tion of the challenged employment action is actually a pretext for
that constitute a plaintiffs prima facie case. See Mendez, Presumptions of Discriminatory
Motive in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1129, 1141 n.67 (1980). A
presumption operates to shift a burden of production to the defendant. Id. at 1244; see infra
note 42 (effect of presumption on defendant's burden of proof).
41 See 450 U.S. at 255 n.10 (presumption amounts to legally mandatory inference of
discrimination).
42 See id. at 254-55 & 255 n.8 (presumption shifts production burden to defendant).
There are two theories about the effect of a mandatory presumption on the opposing party's
burden of proof. See Belton, supra note'8, at 1268-69 (comparison of theories). The "bursting
bubble" theory states that a presumption of discrimination shifts a burden of production to
the opponent to rebut the presumption by presenting evidence contrary to the presumed
fact. Id. at 1268. If the opponent carries the burden of production, then the presumption
disappears and the trier of fact must disregard whatever role the presumption had in the
trial. Id. The second theory states that a presumption shifts both a burden of production
and a burden of persuasion to the opposing party to rebut the presumed fact. Id. In Burdine,
the Supreme Court adopted the "bursting bubble" theory. See 250 U.S. at 255 nn.8 & 10
(presumption only shifts production burden); see also FED. R. EVID. 301 (presumption only
shifts burden of pro.duction to opposing party).
:3 250 U.S. at 260.
' See id. at 254. In Burdine, the Court determined that a defendant carries the burden
of production by introducing a clear and reasonably specific explanation for the challenged
employment action. Id. at 255.
's Id. at 255 n.10 (presumption drops from case once defendant produces non-
discriminatory explanation for employment action). In Burdine, the Court determined that
once a defendant rebuts a presumption of discrimination, then the evidence that the plain-
tiff introduced to create the presumption loses all inferential value. Id. The Burdine Court
found that a defendant's rebuttal of plaintiffs presumption of discrimination does not
preclude the plaintiff from using the evidence that plaintiff introduced to prove a prima
facie case to show that the defendant's explanation of an employment action is a pretext for
discrimination. Id. The Court stated that in certain cases, the combination of a plaintiffs initial
evidence and effective cross-examination of the defendant may suffice to allow a jury to in-




discrimination.4 6 The Court explained that a plaintiff proves that a
defendant's explanation is actually a pretext for discrimination either by
showing that a discriminatory reason motivated the employer to treat
the plaintiff unfavorably or by proving that the defendant's explanation
of the employment action is unworthy of credence.47 The Burdine Court
acknowledged that the ultimate burden of proving that a defendant in-
tentionally discriminated against a plaintiff remains with the plaintiff
throughout the trial.48
The Burdine Court only addressed the allocation of proof for Title
VII bench trials.49 The majority of courts, however, utilize the Burdine
presumption of discrimination in ADEA jury trials. 0 Courts that apply
Title VII proof guidelines to ADEA jury trials usually rely on the First
Circuit's decision in Loeb v. Textron, Inc." Although the First Circuit
decided Loeb before Burdine, the Loeb court was the first court to adopt
the Supreme Court's proof guidelines for Title VII bench trials to an
ADEA jury trial.2 The Loeb court stated that similarities in the aims
and purposes of Title VII and the ADEA allow courts to use the same
process for allocating the burdens of production and persuasion in both
ADEA and Title VII actions.' The Loeb court determined that the
McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines are an orderly way to evaluate the
46 Id. at 256.
47 Id.
" Id. at 253; see FED. R. EvID. 301 (presumption does not shift burden of persuasion
from plaintiff); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2489 (3d ed. 1940 & Supp. 1980) (burden of persuas-
ion never shifts).
"' See 450 U.S. at 250 (narrow question in Burdine was defendant's evidentiary burden
in Title VII bench trial).
I' See Garner v. Boorstin, 690 F.2d 1033, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Burdine analysis
governs ADEA cases); Halsell v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 683 F.2d 285, 289 (8th Cir. 1982)
(Burdine presumption applies in ADEA case even though Burdine involved claim of gender
discrimination); Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1981) (Burdine standards
apply to litigation of claims arising under ADEA).
51 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979); see Halsell v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 683 F.2d 285, 290
(8th Cir. 1982) (court used Loeb court's adaptation of McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines to
allocate evidentiary burdens in ADEA case); Goodman v. Heublein, Inc., 645 F.2d 127, 130
(2d Cir. 1980) (court utilized Loeb court's guidelines for jury instructions in ADEA case).
I See Comment, Adapting Title VIlPrinciples to Age Discrimination in Employment
Jury Trial, 14 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 263, 268 (1980) (Loeb court was first court to use McDon-
nell Douglas proof guidelines in ADEA jury trial).
' See 600 F.2d at 1015. In Loeb, the First Circuit rejected Textron's argument that
Congress' refusal to amend Title VII to include age discrimination indicates that Congress
intended courts to subject ADEA cases to different proof guidelines than Title VII cases.
Id. The Loeb court instead stated that the similarities between the ADEA and Title VII
suggest that Congress intended courts in ADEA cases to use Title VII proof guidelines. Id.
But see Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VIIAction A Social
Policy Perspective, 82 COLuM. L. REV. 292, 310 n.80 (1982) (because Congress patterned
ADEA after Title VII does not mean that same evidentiary burdens apply in both ADEA
and Title VII cases).
19831
600 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
evidence in ADEA jury trials.' The Loeb court held that a judge in an
ADEA jury trial can use the McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines to pre-
sent the important factual issues to the jury."
The Loeb court recognized, however, that the McDonnell Douglas
proof guidelines are flexible, and stated that a judge must modify the
McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines to suit the facts of each particular
case. 6 For example, the Loeb court stated that a judge should not re-
quire an ADEA plaintiff that relies on direct evidence of discriminatory
intent to prove the elements of a prima facie case. 7 The Loeb court also
stated that a judge should require an ADEA plaintiff that relies on cir-
cumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent to establish a prima facie
case by demonstrating that the plaintiff's job performance met an
employer's legitimate expectations. 8 The Loeb court held that
regardless of whether an ADEA plaintiff relies on direct or circumstan-
tial evidence, a judge should instruct the jury that the plaintiff
demonstrates a violation of the ADEA by proving that but for the
employer's discriminatory motive, the plaintiff would not have suffered
the unfavorable employment action. 9
The Fourth Circuit relied on the Loeb court's adaptation of the
McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines to ADEA jury trials to allocate the
burdens of production in Lovelace."0 In Lovelace, Sherwin-Williams
demoted Wilbur Lovelace, a fifty-five year old manager of a Sherwin-
Williams store in Asheville, North Carolina to a salesman. 1 Sherwin-
Williams claimed that Lovelace's demotion was due to Lovelace's declin-
ing performance as store manager.62 After Sherwin-Williams replaced
See 600 F.2d at 1016 (McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines give judges method for
allocating burdens of production and persuasion in ADEA cases).
See id. at 1016-17 (McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines are useful for creating jury
instructions in ADEA trial).
' See id. at 1018-20 (Loeb court offered directions for application of McDonnell
Douglas proof guidelines to different factual situations).
" See id. at 1018 (court should not use McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines if plaintiff
relies on direct evidence of discriminatory intent because McDonnell Douglas proof
guidelines may divert jury from important proof issues).
' See id. at 1014. In Loeb, the First Circuit modified the McDonnell Douglas prima
facie case and required the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case by proving that the plain-
tiff was in the age group protected by the ADEA, that the plaintiffs job performance met
the employer's legitimate expectations, that the employer fired the plaintiff, and that the
employer sought someone else to do the plaintiffs job. Id.
" Id. at 1019.
681 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1982).
" Id. at 235.
"2 See id. at 244. In Lovelace, Sherwin-Williams relied on the Asheville store's sales
records from the period 1970 to 1978 to show that Lovelace's job performance declined after
1977. Id. at 235. The sales records indicated that the Asheville store's profits increased
every year between 1970 and 1973. Id. The Asheville store's sales records also indicated
that the store's profits decreased significantly every year between 1974 and 1978. Id. The
sales records showed that by 1978 the Asheville store's profits-to-inventory ratio and sales-
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Lovelace with a forty-nine year old former manager of another Sherwin-
Williams store, Lovelace sued Sherwin-Williams for violating the
ADEA.6 A jury determined that Sherwin-Williams discriminated
against Lovelace because of Lovelace's age." The district court judge,
however, granted Sherwin-Williams' motion for judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict because Lovelace's evidence was insufficient to support a
reasonable inference of discriminatory intent.65 Lovelace appealed the
district court's judgment to the Fourth Circuit.6
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict. 7 The Fourth Circuit stated that a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict is proper in an ADEA jury trial if there is no
reasonable probability that a jury could infer from a plaintiff's evidence
that an employer treated the plaintiff unfavorably because of the plain-
tiff's age.68 The Fourth Circuit examined Lovelace's circumstantial
evidence both with and without the benefit of the Burdine presumption
to-profit ratio was the lowest of 29 similarly-sized Sherwin-Williams stores. Id. To support
the company's position that Lovelace's job performance was no longer satisfactory, the
Sherwin-Williams management introduced a 1978 job appraisal that ranked Lovelace last
among store managers in the Asheville district. Id. at 236. Sherwin-Williams also claimed
that serious problems in supervision, housekeeping, and merchandizing, as well as




Id. at 235. A court should grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict if the court
believes a directed verdict was proper at the close of the parties' evidence. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 50(b); see also 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2521,
at 537 (1971) (motion for directed verdict allows court to decide whether any question of fact
exists); Cooper, Directions for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal Courts, 55 MINN.
L. REV. 903, 903 (1971) (standard for directed verdict and standard for judgment notwith-
standing verdict are identical). When evaluating a motion for a directed verdict, a court
should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See
Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 396 (1943). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do
not state if there is a proper standard for granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b); see also Wright & Miller, supra, § 2524, at 545-46 (courts adopt
varying standards for judgment notwithstanding verdicts). The Second Circuit states that a
directed verdict is proper if a reasonable man could reach but one conclusion upon the
evidence presented. See Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1970) (district court prop-
erly granted judgment notwithstanding verdict because witnesses' testimonies did not sup-
port jury's decision). The Fifth Circuit holds that a court should not grant a judgment not-
withstanding the verdict if there is substantial evidence opposing the motion. See Boeing
Co, v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374-75 (5th Cir. 1969). The Fourth Circuit has expressed incon-
sistent standards for granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. See 681 F.2d at 243;
see also infra note 100 and accompanying text Wovelace court stated that judgment not-
withstanding verdict is proper if there is no reasonable probability that evidence supports
jury's decisions).
681 F.2d at 235.
"Id.
" Id. at 242; see infra note 100 (discussion of Lovelace court's standard for judgment
notwithstanding verdict).
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of discrimination to determine if a jury reasonably could infer that
Sherwin-Williams demoted Lovelace because of Lovelace's age.69
Lovelace's evidence consisted of Sherwin-Williams' business records
indicating that the Asheville store was profitable while Lovelace was
store manager." Lovelace's evidence also included a 1977 job performance
appraisal by Sherwin-Williams management that gave Lovelace the
third highest of four possible ratings."' Lovelace testified that in
mid-1977 Sherwin-Williams management began visiting the Asheville
store more often, apparently to collect support for Lovelace's eventual
demotion. 2 Assessing Lovelace's evidence without the Burdine presump-
tion of discrimination, the Fourth Circuit determined that Lovelace's
evidence indicated only a possibility that Sherwin-Williams demoted
Lovelace because of Lovelaco's age. 3 The Fourth Circuit held that
Lovelace's circumstantial evidence, independent of the Burdine
presumption of discrimination, could not support a reasonable inference
that discriminatory intent motivated Sherwin-Williams to demote
Lovelace.74
The Fourth Circuit also assessed Lovelace's evidence with the
benefit of the Burdine presumption of discrimination.75 The Fourth Cir-
cuit required Lovelace to prove a prima facie case by demonstrating that
Lovelace's job performance met Sherwin-Williams' legitimate expecta-
tions and by demonstrating that Sherwin-Williams replaced Lovelace
with another employee. 6 The Lovelace court doubted whether Lovelace
established the satisfactory performance element of the prima facie case
because two years separated Lovelace's proof of satisfactory performance
" See 681 F.2d at 242-46 (ADEA plaintiff may prove discriminatory intent with Bur-
dine presumption or without Burdine presumption).
70 See id. at 242-43. In Lovelace, the plaintiff introduced at trial the Asheville store's
profit records for the period between 1970 and 1978 to show that Lovelace's job performance
met Sherwin-Williams' reasonable expectations. Id. at 243 (Asheville store showed profit in
eight of nine years between 1970 and 1978); see supra note 62 (Asheville store's sales
records).
71 681 F.2d at 235.
12 Id. In Lovelace, the plaintiff testified that a Sherwin-Williams district manager
began visiting the store more often in 1977 and complained about problems that did not ex-
ist. Id. Lovelace testified that Sherwin-Williams management created a morale problem
among the store's employees by discussing the store's problems with the employees. Id.
Lovelace also testified that the management began finding more fault with Lovelace's per-
formance as store manager in order to provide support for Lovelace's demotion. Id. The
Sherwin-Williams management testified, however, that management began visiting
Lovelace's store more often in an attempt to discover the source of the store's downward
profit trend. Id. at 235-36.
"' See id at 243 (Lovelace's evidence indicated that age was one possible reason for
Lovelace's demotion).
74 Id.
11 See id. at 244-46 (Lovelace court invoked Burdine presumption).
11 Id. at 239.
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and Lovelace's demotion." The Fourth Circuit assumed for purposes of
the appeal, however, that Lovelace proved a prima facie case of age
discrimination and examined Sherwin-Williams' evidence to determine if
Sherwin-Williams rebutted Lovelace's prima facie case. 8 Sherwin-
Williams' evidence indicated that Sherwin-Williams demoted Lovelace
because Lovelace's job performance declined after 1977 and because
Lovelace refused to enact corrective action that the Sherwin-Williams
management believed would remedy the problems of the Asheville
store."O The Fourth Circuit stated that Sherwin-Williams' evidence in-
dicated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Lovelace's demotion."
The Fourth Circuit found, therefore, that Sherwin-Williams carried a
burden of production and dispelled the probative force of the presump-
tion arising from Lovelace's prima facie case of age discrimination. 1 The
Fourth Circuit rejected Lovelace's claim that Sherwin-Williams' ex-
planation for Lovelace's demotion was a pretext for discrimination
because Lovelace did not introduce sufficient evidence to show that
Sherwin-Williams' explanation was a pretext for discrimination.82 The
Lovelace court held that the district court correctly granted the judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict because Lovelace's circumstantial
evidence, unaided by any presumptive force, did not support a
I See 681 F.2d at 244. In Lovelace, the Fourth Circuit stated that it was questionable
whether Lovelace proved that, at the time of demotion, Lovelace's job performance met
Sherwin-Williams' legitimate expectations. Id. The Fourth Circuit stated that in order to
prove a prima facie case of age discrimination, an ADEA plaintiff must show that the plain-
tiffs job performance continued to meet the employer's legitimate expectations up to the
date of the challenged employment action. Id. The Fourth Circuit held that the credibility of
a prima facie case decreases as the time between the last proven satisfactory performance
and the challenged employment action lengthens. Id. The Fourth Circuit determined,
however, that solely for purposes of Lovelace's appeal, the Fourth Circuit would assume
that Lovelace possessed the requisite qualifications. Id.
7 Id. at 244.
7' See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussion of Sherwin-Williams' reasons
for Lovelace's demotion).
681 F.2d at 244.
" Id. In Lovelace, the Fourth circuit stated that Sherwin-Williams easily carried the
burden of production to rebut Lovelace's prima facie case by introducing admissible evidence
that was not intrinsically unworthy of acceptance and that indicated a legitimate reason for
the employment action. See id. (Sherwin-Williams' evidence indicated that Lovelace's demo-
tion was reasonable business decision).
' Id. at 245. In Lovelace, the Fourth Circuit determined that Lovelace's age was only
one of a number of possible reasons for Lovelace's demotion. Id. The Lovelace court stated
that the essential facts supporting Sherwin-Williams' explanation for Lovelace's demotion
remained unrefuted despite Lovelace's opportunity to show that Sherwin-Williams' explana-
tion was actually a pretext for discrimination. Id. The Lovelace court refused to give any
probative force to Lovelace's opinion that his performance remained satisfactory because
Lovelace's opinion lacked objective corroboration. Id.; see Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm. v. Trans' World Airlines, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 1187, 1220 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (plaintiff's
testimony carries little weight as evidence of job performance).
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reasonable inference that Lovelace's age was a determining factor in
Sherwin-Williams' decision to demote Lovelace."
In rejecting Lovelace's claim of age discrimination, the Fourth Cir-
cuit formulated a proof scheme for an ADEA jury trial by modifying the
Loeb court's analysis to incorporate the Burdine Court's clarification of
the McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines." The Fourth Circuit determined
that the dispositive motivational issue in an ADEA case is whether an
employer treated the plaintiff unfavorably because of the plaintiff's
age."5 The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that a plaintiff retains
throughout the trial the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact
by a preponderance of the evidence that discriminatory intent motivated
the employer to treat the plaintiff unfavorably.86 The Fourth Circuit
stated that an ADEA plaintiff that relies on circumstantial evidence to
demonstrate an employer's discriminatory motivation has the initial
burden of producing evidence to support a prima facie case of age
discrimination." The Lovelace court utilized the Loeb court's modifica-
tion of the McDonnell Douglas elements of a prima facie case and found
that the plaintiff carries the initial burden of production by showing that
the plaintiff's job performance met an employer's legitimate expecta-
tions and by showing that after the plaintiff suffered an adverse employ-
ment action, the employer sought someone else to do the same job.88 The
Fourth Circuit relied upon Burdine and held that proof of a prima facie
case of age discrimination establishes a mandatory, rebuttable presump-
tion of discrimination and shifts a burden of production to the
defendant."
The Lovelace court characterized an ADEA defendant's rebuttal
burden as mild and determined that a defendant carries the burden of
production and rebuts the plaintiff's presumption of discrimination by
producing a nondiscriminatory explanation for the challenged employ-
83 681 F.2d at 246.
', Id. at 238 n.7 & 239-40 (Lovelace court was first Fourth Circuit panel to utilize Bur-
dine opinion in ADEA case). In Lovelace, the Fourth Circuit stated that the Burdine
presumption is applicable to ADEA jury trials because of the similar remedial purposes of
the ADEA and Title VII and the comparable difficulty of proving discriminatory intent
under both Title VII and the ADEA. Id. at 239. The Lovelace court implied that the
Supreme Court in Burdine had recognized that the same proof guidelines are applicable in
both ADEA and Title VII cases by citing Loeb approvingly. Id.; see 450 U.S. at 252 n.4
(Loeb court correctly applied McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines).
' 681 F.2d at 239; see supra text accompanying note 5 (employee must prove age was
determining factor in adverse employment action to prove violation of ADEA).
86 681 F.2d at 240.
See id. at 244 (ADEA plaintiff has burden of production to establish prima facie case
of age discrimination).
" Id. at 239; see supra note 58 and accompanying text (Loeb court's modification of
McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines).




ment action." The Lovelace court followed Burdine and stated that a
defendant's explanation suffices to carry the burden of production if the
explanation is legitimate and is not intrinsically unworthy of
acceptance." The Fourth Circuit utilized the Burdine Court's explana-
tion of a rebuttable presumption of discrimination and determined that a
defendant destroys completely the probative force of a presumption of
age discrimination by carrying the burden of production.2 The Fourth
Circuit stated that by carrying the burden of production, a defendant
narrows the dispositive motivational issue to a new level of specificity.
The Fourth Circuit defined the narrow motivational issue as whether
the employer would not have treated the plaintiff unfavorably in the
absence of the employer's discrimination on account of the plaintiff's
age.9 The Lovelace court held that the burden of producing evidence on
the narrow motivational issue shifts back to the plaintiff.
The Lovelace court found that the plaintiff carries the burden of pro-
duction on the recasted motivational issue by introducing evidence that
demonstrates that the defendant's explanation for the challenged
employment action is a pretext for discrimination. The Lovelace court
relied upon Burdine and determined that the plaintiff shows that the
defendant's explanation is a pretext for discrimination either by produc-
ing evidence that attacks the credibility of the defendant's explanation
or by demonstrating that a discriminatory motive is a more likely ex-
planation for the challenged employment action than is the defendant's
explanation. 7 The Lovelace court stated that a plaintiff can carry the
reacquired burden of production by introducing new evidence to show
that the defendant's explanation for the challenged employment action is
a pretext for discrimination or by relying on the evidence that the plain-
tiff introduced to establish the prima facie case. The Fourth Circuit
' See 681 F.2d at 244 (defendant's rebuttal burden is modest).
91 Id.
2 Id. In Lovelace, the Fourth Circuit stated that if a defendant carries the burden of
production, then the defendant dispells completely the probative force of the presumption
of discrimination. Id. Should the defendant fail to carry the burden of production, then the
presumption requires a court to submit the dispositive motivational issue to the jury with
an instruction in the plaintiffs favor subject only to a credibility determination. Id.; see 450
U.S. at 254 (court must enter judgment in favor of plaintiff if defendant does not rebut
presumption because no issue of fact remains in case).




I Id.; see supra note 47 and accompanying text (Burdine Court's explanation of how
Title VH plaintiff demonstrates that defendant's reasons for employment action are pretext
for discrimination).
, 681 F.2d at 241. Compare id. at 240 (plaintiff may use initial evidence to support in-
ference of intentional discrimination) with 450 U.S. at 255 n.10 (plaintiff may combine initial
evidence with evidence introduced during cross-examination to show that defendant's ex-
planation is pretext for discrimination).
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held that should a plaintiff carry the reacquired burden of production,
then a judge must submit the case to the jury under instructions defin-
ing the recasted motivational issue as whether the decision to demote
the plaintiff would not have been made but for the defendant's motive to
discriminate against the plaintiff because of the plaintiff's age." If the
plaintiff fails to carry the reacquired burden of production, however, a
judge should grant a motion for directed verdict or judgment not-
withstanding the verdict.0
Although the Fourth Circuit in Lovelace relied on Title VII prece-
dent to establish a proof scheme for an ADEA case, the Fourth Circuit
did not consider whether there are fundamental differences between age
discrimination and Title VII discrimination that necessitate different
proof guidelines for ADEA cases.' In Massachusetts Board of Retire-
ment v. Murgia,°2 the Supreme Court acknowledged that age discrimina-
tion differs significantly from the types of discrimination prohibited by
Title VII." 3 The Murgia Court determined that elderly employees have
not suffered a history of bigotry, unlike the persons protected by Title
VII.0 4 The Murgia Court found that blacks and other racial minorities
have experienced employment discrimination because of prejudices that
have nothing to do with the minorities' abilities to work while elderly
681 F.2d at 241.
10 Id. at 240. The Lovelace court determined that the purpose of a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict is to insure that a jury's inference of causation is within the realm of
reasonable probability. Id. at 241. The Fourth Circuit noted that the danger of a jury draw-
ing an inference of causation on the basis of a possibility, rather than a probability, is
especially great in an ADEA jury trial because of the usual unavailability of direct evidence
of discriminatory intent and because" of the strong possibility of a jury reacting out of sym-
pathy for an ADEA plaintiff. Id. at 243. The Fourth Circuit held that a judge must grant a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict if there is no reasonable probability that a jury could
infer causation from the plaintiff's circumstantial evidence. Id. at 243.
I"£ See id. at 238-39 (Title VII proof scheme is appropriate for application in ADEA
litigation).
.0. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
"03 See id. at 313. In upholding a Massachusetts law requiring police officers to retire at
age 50, the Supreme Court in Murgia determined that the class of elderly employees is not a
suspect class for purposes of equal protection under the Constitution because the class has
not experienced a history of purposeful, unequal treatment. Id. The Murgia Court stated
that a legislative enactment that adversely affects a non-suspect class is constitutional if a
rational relationship exists between the enactment and the legislature's aims. Id. at 313-14.
The Supreme Court reasoned that since physical capacity generally declines with age, the
Massachusetts law was constitutional because the law was rationally related to the state's
interest in maintaining an effective police force. Id. at 314-16. The Murgia Court distinguished
the class of elderly employees from the class of persons protected by-Title VII and held that
the minorities protected by Title VII deserve greater constitutional protection than elderly
employees because the minorities protected by Title VII are a suspect class that has ex-
perienced a history of purposeful, unequal treatment. Id. at 313; see Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973 (classifications affecting minorities protected by Title VII are
inherently suspect and are subject to strict judicial scrutiny).
104 427 U.S. at 313.
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employees have experienced employment discrimination because of
stereotyped characteristics about the employees' abilities to work."' The
Murgia Court recognized that aging is a process that affects everyone in
society." Generally, lower courts state that age discrimination differs
significantly from Title VII discrimination since the bigotry that
characterizes Title VII discrimination is usually not present with age
discrimination." 7 The majority of courts, however, hold that the dif-
ferences between age discrimination and Title VII discrimination do not
require courts to alter the Title VII proof guidelines in ADEA cases." 8 A
minority of courts hold that the McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines are
inapplicable in ADEA actions unless courts modify the guidelines to
reflect the fundamental differences between age discrimination and Title
VII discrimination.'
The legislative history of the ADEA indicates that Congress
10 Id.
1 See id. at 313-14 (age potentially affects everyone in society).
1? See Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 155 (7th Cir. 1981) (age
discrimination results from unconscious assumptions about elderly employees' abilities to
perform); Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 107, 112 (1st Cir. 1978) (age
discrimination results from unwarranted conclusions about effects of aging on productivity);
see also Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715, 728 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (age
discrimination is often more subtle than Title VII discrimination), modified, 608 F.2d 1369
(2d Cir. 1979); Note, The Cost of Growing Old: Business Necessity and the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act, 88 YALE L.J. 565,579 (1979) (stereotyped assumptions about elderly
employees' productivity are difficult to detect because assumptions are inherently related
to other judgments about employment).
"I See supra note 50 and accompanying text (majority of courts use Title VII proof
guidelines in ADEA cases). One major distinction between Title VII actions and ADEA ac-
tions is that Title VII actions usually involve refusals to hire while ADEA actions usually in-
volve discharges. See 600 F.2d at 1013 (court modifies prima facie case elements for
discharge case). The majority of courts accommodate the factual variances between Title
VII cases and ADEA cases by modifying the elements of the McDonnell Douglas prima
facie case to suit the facts of each case rather than by altering the proof guidelines. See Par-
cinski v. Outlet Co., 672 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1982) (termination); Riley v. University of
Lowell, 651 F.2d 822, 825 (1st Cir. 1981) (denied promotion); Sutton v. Atlantic Richfield, 646
F.2d 407, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1981) (involuntary retirement).
1" See Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 312 (6th Cir. 1975) (inappropriate to
use McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines in ADEA action because of differences between
age discrimination and Title VII discrimination); Williams v. City & County of San Fran-
cisco, 483 F. Supp. 335, 344 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (fact that age is progressive condition presents
clear impediment to adoption of Title VII case law to ADEA cases), rev'd on other grounds,
685 F.2d 450 (1982); Marshall v. Hills Bros., 432 F. Supp. 1320, 1325 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (signifi-
cant differences between Title VII discrimination and age discrimination require courts to
use different requirements for prima facie cases in ADEA actions than in Title VII actions);
Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1299, 1306 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (courts must
treat ADEA cases differently from Title VII cases because of lack of widespread age
discrimination). See generally Note, The Age Discrimination In Employment Act Of 1967,
90 HARV. L. R~v. 380, 388-99, 411 (1976) (courts should avoid automatic application of Title
VII proof guidelines in ADEA cases because age discrimination is less obvious than Title
VII discrimination).
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recognized that there are fundamental differences between age
discrimination and Title VII discrimination.11 Unlike race discrimination,
Congress believed that age discrimination could occur simply from an
unconscious application of stereotyped notions of ability rather than
from a deliberate desire to remove elderly employees from the work
force."' To afford elderly employees protection from intentional age
discrimination, Congress provided that courts in ADEA actions can
award liquidated damages to plaintiffs that prove willful violations of
the act.' Liquidated damages compensate a plaintiff for the
nonpecuniary losses, such as back pay and benefits, that arise out of an
employer's willful violation of the ADEA.113 Congress subsequently
amended the ADEA to grant plaintiffs seeking liquidated damages the
right to a jury trial.1 Congress, however, has not granted a right to a
' See 113 CONG. REC. H34,752 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Dwyer) (invidious hostility that
permeates Title VII discrimination is not present in age discrimination); 113 CONG. REC. H
34,742 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Burke) (arbitrary nature of age discrimination is not present
with Title VII discrimination); 113 CONG. REC. H31,254 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Javits) (age
discrimination is completely arbitrary while Title VII discrimination results from bigotry);
see also Age Discrimination in Employment Hearings on H.R. 13054 Before the General
Subcommittee in Labor of the Committee on Education and Labor. House of Representa-
tives, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1967) (statement of Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor) (age
discrimination is entirely different from Title VII discrimination because bigotry that
characterizes Title VII discrimination does not effect age discrimination). See generally
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 585 n.14 (1978) (different remedial and procedural provisions
under ADEA and Title VII suggest that Congress had different intentions when Congress
enacted ADEA).
,' See 113 CONG. REC. H34,742 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Burke) (age discrimination
arises because of erroneous assumptions that employers make about effects of age on per-
formance); see also Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 155 (7th Cir. 1981)
(Congress believed non-willful age discrimination toward employees was possible).
112 See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976) (liquidated damages are available only in cases of willful
violations of ADEA). To prove willfulness under the ADEA, an ADEA plaintiff must show
that a defendant's actions were knowing and voluntary, and that the defendant knew or
should have known that defendant's actions violated the act. See Syvock v. Milwaukee
Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 156, 156 n.10 (7th Cir. 1981) (standard for willfulness focuses
on defendant's state of mind).
"' See Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 154 (7th Cir. 1981) (liquidated
damages equal back pay and benefits that employer denied to plaintiff).
", See 29 U.S.C. 626(c)(2) (Supp. V 1981) (jury trial is available to plaintiffs seeking
monetary damages arising from ADEA violations); see also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575,
585 (1977). In Lorillard, the Supreme Court held that the ADEA provides a jury trial right
to plaintiffs seeking unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation. Id. The Court
reasoned that Congress evidenced an intention to provide a right to a jury trial by em-
powering courts to award legal relief for ADEA violations since the seventh amendment
guarantees a jury trial right to persons seeking legal relief. See id. at 583; see also U.S. CONST.
amend. VII (jury trial available for persons seeking legal relief); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976)
(courts can award legal relief to ADEA claimants). Congress specifically amended the
ADEA after Lorillard to insure that plaintiffs seeking liquidated damages have a right to a
jury trial. See H.R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 504, 535 (ADEA plaintiffs seeking liquidated damages have jury trial right).
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jury trial to Title VII plaintiffs.11 Almost all courts hold that a jury trial
is unavailable to Title VII plaintiffs seeking damages because Title VII
allows courts to award only equitable damages."' The principle distinc-
tion, therefore, between Title VII and the ADEA is that the ADEA ex-
pressly provides for jury trials while Title VII does not provide for jury
trials."7 The presence of juries in ADEA actions introduces an important
procedural consideration that does not exist in Title VII bench trials
since judges that use the McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines in ADEA
jury trials must develop clear instructions to aid jurors in determining
how to draw an inference of discrimination from a plaintiff's circumstan-
tial evidence.'
The availability of the McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines in ADEA
jury trials is not clear since the Supreme Court never has decided
whether courts can use the guidelines in jury trials."1 Generally, courts
recognize that the presence of juries in ADEA trials impairs the effec-
tiveness of the McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines because judges
often have difficulty in explaining the proof guidelines to jurors. ° For
example, the Loeb court stated that the subtleties of the shifting
"I See Comment, The Right to Jury Trial Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 37 U. CHi. L. REV. 167, 171 (1969) (Congress did not intend to provide right to jury trial
in Title VII civil actions).
I" See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th Cir.) (jury trial is unavailable
to Title VII plaintiff seeking back pay award), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); King v.
Laborers' Int'l Union, 443 F.2d 273, 279 (6th Cir. 1971) (courts should not present Title VII
equitable issues to juries); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125
(5th Cir. 1969) (courts should determine equitable issues involved in Title VII cases rather
than juries). Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976 & Supp. II 1979) (courts may only award
equitable relief to Title VII claimants) with 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976) (courts may award legal
or equitable relief to ADEA claimants). See generally Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583-84
(1977) (Supreme Court refused to decide if jury trial is available under Title VII).
"' See Blakeboro, supra note 13, at 103 (major difference between ADEA and Title VII
is that ADEA plaintiffs have jury trial right).
"' See 600 F.2d at 1016 (court's failure to develop clear jury instructions defeats jury
trial right).
11 See McKenry, Enforcement of Age Discrimination Employment Legislation, 32
HASTINGS L.J. 1157, 1169 (1981) (applicability of McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines to
ADEA jury trial is uncertain because Supreme Court did not create proof guidelines for
jury trials); Schickman, The Strengths and Weaknesses of the McDonnell Douglas Formula
in Jury Actions Under the ADEA, -32 HASTINGS L.J. 1239, 1258 (1981) (fact that Court
created McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines solely for bench trials limits use of proof
guidelines in jury trials).
" See infra notes 121-123 and accompanying text (courts have problems adapting
McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines to ADEA jury trials); see also Blakeboro, supra note
13, at 108-09 (requirement that jury examine elements of plaintiff's prima facie case overpar-
ticularizes jury's inquiry); Schickman, supra note 119, at 1258 (McDonnell Douglas proof
guidelines distract jury from issue of whether age discrimination occurred); Age
Discrimination, supra note 109, at 398 (courts have difficulties articulating McDonnell
Douglas proof guidelines in jury instructions).
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burdens in the McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines often can confuse
jurors. 1' The Loeb court determined that the McDonnell Douglas proof
guidelines may divert a juror's attention from the ultimate question of
discrimination." The Lovelace court acknowledged that judges often
have trouble adapting the McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines to ADEA
jury trials because the McDonnell Douglas Court created the proof
guidelines for cases involving a refusal to hire while almost all ADEA
cases involve discharges or demotions."u Despite the difficulties that
courts generally have in adapting the McDonnell Douglas proof
guidelines to ADEA jury trials, a majority of courts continue to rely on
the proof guidelines to allocate the burdens of production and persuasion
in ADEA jury trials."'
The Sixth Circuit recognizes the difficulties in adapting the McDon-
nell Douglas guidelines to an ADEA jury trial and does not use the
McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines in ADEA jury trials."l In Laugesen
v. Anaconda,28 the Sixth Circuit affirmed a lower court's refusal to in-
struct the jury that the McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines required
the defendant to produce a nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's
dismisal"I The Laugesen court stated that Congress' decision to enact
the ADEA as a statute independent of Title VII indicated that Congress
did not intend courts in ADEA actions to automatically apply Title VII
proof guidelines. 28 The Laugesen court held that the McDonnell Douglas
proof guidelines are inapplicable to ADEA jury trials because the
McDonnell Douglas Court did not attempt to address the problems and
procedures inherent in submitting issues to juries." The Laugesen court
121 See 600 F.2d at 1016 (legal concepts of prima facie case and shifting burdens often
confuse jurors).
" See id. In Loeb, the First Circuit stated that a reading of the McDonnell Douglas
proof guidelines to jurors often leads jurors to abandon the jurors' judgment and rely on
poorly understood concepts of law to decide the ultimate question of discrimination. Id.
'" See 681 F.2d at 239 n.8 (difficult to adapt McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines to
ADEA cases because ADEA cases typically involve discharges while McDonnell Douglas
involved refusal to hire).
12' See supra notes 15-25 and accompanying text (majority of courts use three-stage
proof scheme in ADEA cases that is adaptation of McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines).
1 See Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 312 (6th Cir. 1975) (courts should not
automatically apply McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines to ADEA jury trials).
125 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975).
1 See id. at 311 (Laugesen court supported trial court's refusal to apply McDonnell
Douglas proof guidelines to ADEA jury trial).
11 See 510 F.2d at 312 n.4 (Congress did not intend courts to use Title VII proof
guidelines in ADEA cases).
19 Id. at 312-13. The Laugesen court recognized two considerations that arise in ADEA
jury trials and are not present in Title VII bench trials. Id. The first consideration is the
need to present evidence in a clear manner so that the jury can make the ultimate decision
of liability based upon the jury's determination of the weight and credibility of the evidence.
Id. at 312. The second consideration is the need to develop clear jury instructions to aid a
jury in deciding whether discrimination occurred. Id.
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stated that courts should simply submit ADEA cases to juries with an
instruction that the burden is on the plaintiff to prove age discrimina-
tion.130
Although the Sixth Circuit does not utilize the McDonnell Douglas
proof guidelines in ADEA jury trials, the Fourth Circuit consistently has
relied on the McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines to allocate the
burdens of production in ADEA jury trials. '31 In Lovelace, the Fourth
Circuit recognized that the purpose of the proof guidelines is to facilitate
an ADEA plaintiff's ability to prove discriminatory intent with cir-
cumstantial evidence.'32 The Lovelace court, therefore, imposed a light
burden of production on Lovelace and invoked the Burdine presumption
although Lovelace's proof of a prima facie case was unconvincing. 3 The
Lovelace court then imposed an equally light burden of production on
Sherwin-Williams and allowed Sherwin-Williams to rebut Lovelace's
prima facie case by simply introducing a reason for Lovelace's
dismissal." Since the Fourth Circuit did not require Sherwin-Williams
to demonstrate that Sherwin-Williams' explanation was the actual
reason for Lovelace's demotion,'35 the Lovelace court imposed a difficult
burden on Lovelace to prove that Sherwin-Williams' explanation was a
pretext for discrimination.'38
A court can insure that an employer provides the actual reason for
an employment action by placing a burden of persuasion on the employer
to prove the existence of a nondiscriminatory reason for the employment
action.'37 A minority of courts have attempted to ease ADEA plaintiffs'
difficulties in proving that an employer's explanation is a pretext for
"I Id at 312 (court approved jury instruction requiring plaintiff simply to prove age
discrimination by preponderance of evidence).
131 See Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1115 (4th Cir.) (Feld, J., dissenting)
(McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines are orderly presentation of evidence in ADEA cases),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981); Smith v. University of North Carolina, 632 F.2d 316, 333
(4th Cir. 1980) (McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines are appropriate method for allocating
burdens of proof in ADEA case); Smith v. Flax, 618 F.2d 1062, 1066 n.3 (4th Cir. 1980)
(McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines are guidance for allocating burdens of proof in ADEA
cases).
"3 See 681 F.2d at 239 (Title VII proof guidelines favor plaintiffs in initial stages of
proof).
'. See id. at 244 (Lovelace court stated that plaintiff's evidence triggered presumption
of discrimination although Lovelace court questioned plaintiff's proof of prima facie case).
See id. at 245 (defendant's burden of production is modest).
" See id. (defendant carries production burden by introducing reason that is not
manifestly incredible); see also Belton, supra note 8, at 1246 (major problem with Burdine
presumption is that defendant does not need to produce actual reason for employment ac-
tion).
'. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text (Lovelace court's explanation of how
ADEA plaintiff proves that employer's explanation is pretext for discrimination).
'" See Belton, supra note 8, at 1266-71 (court should impose burden of persuasion on
defendant to show that nondiscriminatory reason motivated defendant).
1983]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
discrimination by shifting a burden of persuasion to the defendant.38 An
ADEA plaintiff's burden to prove that an employer's explanation is a
pretext for discrimination is especially formidable if a court allows the
employer to offer a non-specific reason for the challenged employment
action since age discrimination is usually hard to detect.'39 By allowing
both Lovelace and Sherwin-Williams to carry the respective burdens of
production with little difficulty, "' the Fourth Circuit failed to facilitate
Lovelace's ability to prove discriminatory intent with circumstantial
evidence since the Fourth Circuit did not narrow the dispositive motiva-
tional issue to whether Sherwin-Williams' explanation or Lovelace's
claim of age discrimination was the true reason for Lovelace's
demotion.' The Lovelace court, therefore, did not accomplish the pur-
pose of the Lovelace court's proof scheme.' The Lovelace court achieved
the same result as though the Fourth Circuit had followed Laugeson
because the dispositive issue in Lovelace was simply whether Lovelace
proved age discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.'
In Lovelace, the Fourth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's proof
guidelines for Title VII cases to establish a proof scheme for ADEA
cases that involve circumstantial proof of discriminatory intent."' The
"2S ee Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 550 F.2d 1113, 1114 (8th Cir. 1977) (employer
has burden of proof to justify action on basis other than age); Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear,
Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715, 728-29 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (defendant has burden of proving existence of
nondiscriminatory reason for challenged employment action), modified, 608 F.2d 1369 (2d
Cir. 1979).
"' See supra notes 105 & 107 (courts recognize that age discrimination is usually subtle
since age discrimination results from unconscious assumptions about elderly employees'
ability to work); supra notes 110-111 (Congress recognized that age discrimination results
from erroneous assumptions about elderly employees' ability to work); see also Schickman,
supra note 119, at 1255-56 (McDonnell Douglas Court's requirement that plaintiff must prove
employer's explanation is pretext for discrimination does not address distinct evidentiary
difficulties ADEA plaintiffs encounter); cf. Burdens ofProof, supra note 32, at 651 (Title VII
plaintiffs task of proving pretext is formidable).
.' See supra notes 133-135 and accompanying text (Lovelace and Sherwin Williams car-
ried light burdens of production). Courts generally allow ADEA plaintiffs and defendants to
carry the respective production burdens with little difficulty. See Schickman, supra note
119, at 1242-43 (ADEA plaintiffs and defendants carry production burdens easily); see also
Garner v. Boorstin, 690 F.2d 1034, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (ADEA plaintiffs initial burden to
establish prima facie case is not difficult); Cline v. Roadway, 689 F.2d 481, 485 (4th Cir. 1982)
(ADEA defendant's production burden is relatively light).
... See 450 U.S. at 255 n.8 (Burdine presumption intended to progressively sharpen in-
quiry into factual question of intentional discrimination).
142 See supra notes 8 & 9 and accompanying text (purpose of proof scheme is to
facilitate plaintiffs ability to prove discriminatory intent with circumstantial evidence).
"' See supra text accompanying notes 125-130 (Laugesen court rejected use of McDon-
nell Douglas proof guidelines in ADEA cases). See generally Note, The Prima Facie Ap-
proach to Employment Discrimination, 33 ME. L. REV. 195, 204 (1981) (third stage of ADEA
proof order determines outcome of most ADEA cases because proof standards for first two
stages are not stringent).
." See supra text accompanying notes 26-30 (McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines); text
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Fourth Circuit did not consider whether the differences between age
discrimination and Title VII discrimination require different proof
guidelines for ADEA cases.' The Fourth Circuit also did not consider
whether the presence of juries in ADEA cases requires different proof
guidelines for ADEA cases since the Supreme Court created the Title
VII proof guidelines for bench trials.'46 Furthermore, the Fourth
Circuit's proof scheme does not facilitate an ADEA plaintiff's ability to
prove discriminatory intent with circumstantial evidence because the
proof scheme does not focus the inquiry into whether discriminatory in-
tent motivated an employer to treat the plaintiff unfavorably.'47 The
Fourth Circuit's proof scheme, therefore, is an ineffective addition to
ADEA jury trials that only complicates ADEA litigation by diverting
jurors' attentions from the crucial question of whether age discrimina-
tion occurred.'48 To promote the congressional desire to eliminate ar-
bitrary age discrimination,' the Fourth Circuit should follow the Sixth
Circuit's decision in Laugeson by rejecting application of the Title VII
proof guidelines in ADEA jury cases and should adopt a proof analysis
for ADEA cases that accounts for the differences between age
discrimination and Title VII discrimination and the distinctions between
jury trials and bench trials.5 '
JAMES DAVID SIMPSON, JR.
B. Standards of Proof in Title VIII Cases
Congress passed Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968' (Title VIII
accompanying notes 38-48 (Burdine Court's clarification of McDonnell Douglas proof guide-
lines); text accompanying notes 84-100 (Lovelace court's proof scheme).
"3 See supra text accompanying notes 101-109 (Supreme Court and lower courts
recognize fundamental differences exist between age discrimination and Title VII
discrimination); text accompanying notes 110-111 (Congress recognized differences exist
between age discrimination and Title VII discrimination).
"' See supra text accompanying notes 120-124 (majority of courts recognize difficulties
in adapting Title VII proof guidelines to ADEA jury trials).
" See supra text accompanying notes 132-143 (Lovelace court's proof scheme is inef-
fective).
"' See supra note 114 and accompanying text (Congress granted jury trial right in
ADEA cases); notes 119-122 and accompanying text (Title VII proof guidelines divert jurors'
attentions from crucial issues in ADEA jury trials).
' See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (Congress intended ADEA to eradicate
arbitrary age discrimination).
11 See supra text accompanying notes 126-130 (Laugesen court rejected application of
McDonnell Douglas proof guidelines in ADEA jury trials).
' Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 801, 82 Stat. 73, 81 (1968) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631
(1976 & Supp. 1I 1979)).
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or the Act) intending to provide for fair housing in the United States.2 Ti-
tle VIII implements a congressional purpose to replace racially segre-
gated housing with truly integrated living patterns.' The courts have
responded to the congressional mandate by interpreting Title VIII
broadly to eliminate all traces of public and private discrimination in the
2 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1976). Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Title VIII or the
Act) is only part of a broad government scheme mandating fair housing. In 1962, President
Kennedy issued an Executive Order on Equal Opportunity in Housing. Exec. Order No.
11,063, 3 C.F.R. 652 (1959-63 Compliation), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 1982 app. at 375-76 (1976).
Executive Order 11,063 prohibits discrimination based on race, color, creed or national
origin with respect to the disposition of residential property by lending institutions, real
estate developers, and other parties who receive direct federal funding or federal assistance
indirectly through state or local agencies that receive federal funding. Id. Since private
lending institutions finance most of the nation's housing, the scope of the order is narrow.
U.S. COMM-N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING ENFORCEMENT EFFORT 29 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as ENFORCEMENT EFFORT].
Congress enacted another statute to eliminate discrimination in housing, Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI). Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 601, 78 Stat. 252, 498 (1964)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-5 (1976)). Title VI prohibits discrimination in any pro-
gram or activity receiving federal financial assistance. Id. Title VI prohibits housing
discrimination when state and local governments use federal financial assistance to operate
low-income housing. Id. In addition, when benefits from federally assisted programs favor
residents of a certain area, state and local governments may not limit minority access to the
areas by restricting minority housing opportunities. See ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, supra, at 2
(Title VI bars exclusion of minorities from areas receiving benefits of federally assisted pro-
grams). The scope of Title VI is narrow because only one-half of one percent of the nation's
housing receives the benefits of federally assisted programs. Note, Is the U.S. Committed
to Fair Housing? Enforcement of the Fair Housing Act Remains A Crucial Problem, 29
CATH. U.L. REV. 641, 643 (1980).
In addition to Executive Order 11,063 and Title VI, the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
through which Congress guaranteed equal property rights to all United States citizens
regardless of race, affords a basis for enforcement of private rights involving the sale or
rental of housing. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)); see Comment, Fair Housing- The Use of Testers to Enforce
Fair Housing Laws- When Testers are Sued, 21 ST. Louis U.L.J. 170, 172-73 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Testers] (§ 1982 affords a basis for private rights of action asserting
discrimination in housing); see also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 410 (1968). In
Jones, the Supreme Court interpreted Section 1982 as a valid exercise of congressional
power under the thirteenth amendment to eliminate the badges and incidents of slavery, in-
cluding racial discrimination in public and private housing. 392 U.S. at 410, 438-39.
The lower courts consistently have held that Title VIII is an appropriate exercise of
congressional power under the thirteenth amendment. See, e.g., Williams v. Matthews Co.,
499 F.2d 819, 825 (8th Cir.) (Title VIII, like Civil Rights Act of 1866, is exercise of congres-
sional power under the thirteenth amendment), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974); United
States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115, 120-21 (5th Cir.) (court deferred to con-
gressional determination that Title VIII will effectuate thirteenth amendment's purpose by
aiding in elimination of badges and incidents of slavery), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973);
United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 214 (4th Cir.) (Title VIII is valid exercise of congres-
sional power under thirteenth amendment to eliminate badges and incidents of slavery),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972).
3 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale) (intent of Title VIII is to
replace ghettos with integrated and balanced living patterns). Senator Mondale was one of
the sponsors of Title VIII in Congress. See Schwemm, Discriminatory Effect and the Fair
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housing field." Title VIII's provisions prohibit a broad range of practices
that deny housing to persons because of race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.' Title VIII provisions also apply to a wide variety of parties
who employ discriminatory practices, including brokers, apartment
house owners, mortgage lenders, municipalities, and public agencies.'
The Act bars any of these parties from employing discriminatory prac-
tices such as refusing to rent or sell a dwelling,' indicating a preference
Housing Act, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 199, 208 (1978). Congress recognized that racial
discrimination in American housing market posed a serious national problem. See 114 CONG.
REC. 3127 (1968) (statement of Sen. Hatfield) (impact of housing segregation reaches into
most aspects of daily life, including employment, education, public accomodation, and
religious worship); id. at 3133-34 (statement of Sen. Mondale) (pattern of racial segregation
in housing affects employment opportunities and racial composition and quality of schools).
' See, e.g., Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979) (Court
read Title VIII broadly to extend standing under statute to persons participating in in-
vestigatory techniques to test racial discrimination in housing); Trafficante v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1972) (lower courts can vitalize Title VIII only by
generously construing statute); Marr v. Rife, 503 F.2d 735, 740 (6th Cir. 1974) (court refused
to defeat congressional plan to eliminate all traces of discrimination in housing by narrow
interpretation of Title VIII).
5 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1976). Congress passed the National Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974, amending Title VIII, to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex
in the sale or rental of housing. Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 808(b) (1)-(4), 88 Stat. 729 (1974), amend-
ing 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606 (1976). Section 3604 of Title VII prohibits several practices that
limit equal housing opportunities. See United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179,.
1182 (8th Cir.) (exclusionary land use control), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); Laufman v.
Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489, 492-93 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (mortgage red-lining);
Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1047 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (racial steering), aff'd in relevant
part, 547 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1977). In Black Jack, the plaintiff alleged that the city's adop-
tion of a municipal zoning ordinance denied housing to persons on the basis of race. 508 F.2d
at 1182. The complaint in Laufman claimed that the defendant mortgage company violated
Title VIII by outlining areas in the community where minority groups concentrated and
refusing to make loans in those areas. 408 F. Supp. at 492-93. The Zuch plaintiffs asserted
that the defendant real estate agencies steered prospective buyers into a certain housing
area on the basis of race. 394 F. Supp. at 1037.
' See Comment, Applying the Title VII Prima Facie Case to Title VIII Litigation, 11
HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 128, 140 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Prima Facie Case] (public entities
and private parties both subject to Title VIII prohibitions). Title VIII's provisions primarily
affect members of the housing industry. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDERSTANDING
FAIR HOUSING 3 (1973). The courts have held that Title VIII also applies to municipalities
and public agencies. See, e.g., United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562, 573 (6th Cir.
1981) (Title VIII applies to activities of municipalities); United States v. City of Black Jack,
508 F.2d 1179, 1183-84 (8th Cir.) (local governments not immune from proscriptions of Title
VIII), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
Congress explicitly exempted from Title VIII's coverage the sale of a single family
house when the owner owns no more than three such houses at any one time, uses no
discriminatory advertisements, and lists none of the dwellings with a rental service. 42
U.S.C. § 3603 (1976). Congress, in Title VIII, also exempted property owned by religious
organizations and used for other than a commercial purpose. Id. § 3607.
7 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1976); see, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789, 791 (5th
Cir. 1978) (significant discriminatory effect stemming from rental decisions violated §
3604(a) of Title VIII); Stevens v. Dobbs, 483 F.2d 82, 83 (4th Cir. 1973) (apartment owner's
rental policy based on racial animus violated Title VIII).
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in advertising,8 denying access to brokerage services,9 or denying real
estate loans. '°
A judicial determination of discrimination is a prerequisite for a
violation of Title VIII." Courts have employed two different standards
to ascertain whether a particular action by a public or private party
discriminates in violation of Title VIII." Courts applying the traditional
standard hold a Title VIII violation exists when a plaintiff shows that
the defendant's discriminatory intent or purpose motivated the challenged
practice. 3 Courts also apply the prima facie concept, a more recent stand-
ard courts developed to detect violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 19644 (Title VII) in employment discrimination cases.15 In Title
VII litigation, the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of employment
discrimination by demonstrating that a facially neutral employment
' 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1976); see United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 211 (4th Cir.)
(publication of discriminatory rental notice in newspaper violated § 3604(c) of Title VIII,
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972).
9 42 U.S.C. § 3606 (1976); see Johnson v. Jerry Pals Real Estate, 485 F.2d 528, 529 (7th
Cir. 1973) (agent's failure to provide complete rental listings to black couple violated § 3606
of Title VIII).
-0 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1976); see Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489,
493-95 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (building and loan association's mortgage red-lining practice violated
§ 3605 of Title VIII); supra note 5 (definition of mortgage red-lining).
"I See United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1053-54 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (Con-
gress designed Title VIII to prohibit all forms of discrimination), cert. denied, - U.S.
-, 102 S.Ct. 1972, reh. denied, - U.S. - , 102 S.Ct. 2308 (1982).
12 Id. at 1053 (courts have applied two different standards of proof under Title VIII).
" Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Northside Realty Assocs., 474 F.2d 1164, 1171 (5th
Cir.) (court analysis of defendant's liability under Title VIII employed intent standard), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976); United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221, 226
(5th Cir. 1971) (court used intent standard under Title VIII); see also Testers, supra note 2,
at 178 (in early Title VIII litigation plaintiffs had burden of showing that challenged action
resulted solely from racial considerations). To prove a Title VIII violation under the intent
standard, the plaintiff must show that racial motivation was one factor in the defendant's
formulation of the challenged practice. See Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032,
1042 (2d Cir. 1979) (race need not be sole motivating factor behind challenged action for
violation of Title VIII to occur); Williams v. Matthews -Co., 499 F.2d 819, 826 (8th Cir.) (racial
considerations in formation of housing policies is impermissible even when racial policy is
not sole motive behind challenged conduct), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974).
Under the intent standard, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant intentionally
discriminated to establish violations of the fifth amendment and the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. See Testers, supra note 2, at 179 (constitutional violations re-
quire proof of intentional discrimination); infra text accompanying notes 73 & 74 (Supreme
Court has held that constitutional claims of discrimination require proof of discriminatory
intent).
" Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701, 78 Stat. 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(Supp. III 1979)). Sections 2000e-2(a)(1) and (a)(2) of Title VII prohibit employers from
discriminating against any individual because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin
in both pu'blic and private employment. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 (a)(1) to 2000e-2(a)(2) (Supp. III
1979).
,S See infra text Prima Facie Case, supra note 6, at 128-29 (courts recently have ad-
dressed question of applicability of Title VII prima facie standard to Title VIII).
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practice has a racially discriminatory effect.16 Courts applying the prima
facie concept to Title VIII litigation have held that a plaintiff establishes
a prima facie case of housing discrimination by demonstrating that a
facially neutral housing practice has a discriminatory effect, even
without showing the defendant's discriminatory intent.17
The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether a showing that a
housing practice has a discriminatory effect sufficiently establishes a
prima facie Title VIII violation.18 Several lower courts, however, have
"' Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). In Griggs, the court first pro-
mulgated the prima facie test. Id. at 431-33. The Court held that the plaintiff's showing of
discriminatory effect was sufficient to prove that the defendant violated Title VII without
requiring the plaintiff to show the defendant's discriminatory intent. Id. at 432.
"7 See, e.g., Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 146 (3d Cir. 1977) (plaintiff
established prima facie Title VIII case by proving that defendant's conduct has
discriminatory effect), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536
F.2d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1976) (concept of prima facie case applies to housing discrimination
suits); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir.) (Title VIII cases
employ concept of prima facie case that requires plaintiff to establish discriminatory effect),
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
In fair housing actions, housing practices or regulations promulgated by public entities
or private individuals that promote segregation or cause greater harm to a protected group
than to the population as a whole produce "discriminatory effects." See Comment, Justify-
ing a Discriminatory Effect Under the Fair Housing Act. A Search for the Proper Stan-
dard, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 398, 399 n.8 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Proper Standard]
(discriminatory effects definition).
To measure the nature of the discriminatory effect necessary for the plaintiff to
establish a prima facie case under Title VIII, the courts have relied on statistical analysis.
See Testers, supra note 2, at 182. One approach to statistical proof of racial discrimination is
the minority underrepresentation method. See Schwemm, supra note 3, at 243. The under-
representation method permits the court to infer discrimination in cases in which minorities
are underrepresented in or totally absent from the defendant's housing. Id. at 243-44.
Another approach to statistical proof of racial discrimination is for the plaintiff to present
proof that a facially neutral selection practice of the defendant disproportionately excludes
minorities from the defendant's housing. Id. at 246.
The use of testers is another means of establishing a prima facie case of racial
discrimination. Testers, supra note 2, at 183. Testers are people who investigate whether
racial motivation influenced a particular denial of housing. Id. at 184. The tester poses as a
prospective tenant or homebuyer to determine the reaction of a particular landlord or real
estate agent to the tester's race. Id. at 183-84.
" On two occasions the Supreme Court has remanded a Title VIII housing case to the
lower courts rather than rule on the prima facie standard. See Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 (1977) (remanded to Seventh Circuit to
decide whether defendant's housing policy violated Title VIII); Joseph Skillken & Co. v.
City of Toledo, 429 U.S. 1068, 1075 (1977) (remanded to the Sixth Circuit for further con-
sideration of Title VIII issue in light of Arlington Heights decision). On remand, the
Seventh Circuit in Arlington held that the discriminatory effects produced by the defen-
dant's housing policy established a prima facie violation of Title VIII. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1294 (7th Cir. 1977) (Arlington I1),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); see infra text accompanying notes 63-68 (Arlington H
discussion). On remand in Skillken, the Sixth Circuit adhered to its previous decision that
the refusal of a municipal defendant to rezone an area to permit building of low-income
public housing was not unconstitutionally discriminatory. Joseph Skillken & Co. v. City of
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ruled that the prima facie concept applies to Title VIII litigation for a
number of reasons. 9 The courts use the prima facie Title VII standard
because of the similar statutory language of Titles VII and VIII." The
courts also apply the Title VII prima facie standard because both Titles
VII and VIII address the consequences of discrimination and not simply
the motivation behind it."-Moreover, courts have held the prima facie
standard applicable to Title VIII because of the difficulties inherent in
proving a defendant's specific intent to discriminate.22
Toledo, 558 F.2d 350, 351 (6th Cir. 1977); see Joseph Skillken & Co. v. City of Toledo, 528
F.2d 867, 879 (6th Cir. 1975) (original Sixth Circuit decision), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S.
1068 (1977), decision adhered to, 558 F.2d 350 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 985 (1977). In a
brief per curiam opinion, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in
Arlington Heights supported its previous decision. 558 F.2d at 351. The remand opinion,
like the earlier Sixth Circuit decision, did not discuss the plaintiff's Title VIII claim. See id.
at 350-51.
The sparse legislative history of Title VIII does not establish whether Title VIII pro-
hibits neutral housing practices with unintended discriminatory effects. See Schwemm,
supra note 3, at 209 (nothing in legislative history of Title VIII clearly resolves question
whether Title VIII covers cases of discriminatory effect). The fair housing laws were an
amendment to a civil rights workers' protection bill the House Judiciary Committee pro-
posed in June, 1967. See H.R. 2516, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.; see also S. REP. No. 721, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1837, 1838. Title VIII
came to the Senate floor as an amendment to the Civil Rights Bill in 1968. 114 CONG. REC.
2270-73 (1968). The assassination of Martin Luther King and the general racial tensions of
the late 1960's served to accellerate congressional consideration of the amendment.
Schwemm, supra note 3, at 208; see 114 CONG. REC. 2274 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale)
(fair housing legislation is keystone to any solution of present urban crisis). The amended
version of the bill quickly passed both the House and the Senate, resulting in a dearth of
committee hearings, reports, or other legislative papers courts often use to ascertain
legislative intent. See Comment, A Last Stand in Arlington Heights: Title VIII and the Re-
quirement of Discriminatory Intent, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV. 150, 158 n.58 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Last Stand] (rapid passage of Title VIII resulted in dearth of legislative papers). A
number of courts have examined the length Senate debates to determine congressional in-
tent. Id.; see Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 147 (3d Cir. 1977) (examined
Senate debates to determine congressional purpose behind Title VIII), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
908 (1978).
" See infra text accompanying notes 20-22 (courts' rationale for applying Title VII
prima facie standard to Title VIII violations).
See infra notes 69 & 78 (Seventh and Third Circuits recognized statutory language
of Titles VII and VIII is similar).
" See, e.g., Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 147 (3d Cir. 1977) (court
noted Supreme Court has emphasized need to construe both Title VII and Title VIII
broadly), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 938 (1978); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d
1179,1184-85 (8th Cir. 1974) (prima facie concept governs burden of proof in Title VIII cases
because effect not motivation is touchstone), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); see also
Prima Facie Case, supra note 6, at 154 (purpose of Title VII and Title VIII is to redress con-
sequences of discrimination).
See, e.g., Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d
1283, 1288-90 (7th Cir.) (strict focus on intent allows racial discrimination to go unpunished
absent evidence of overt bigotry), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); United States v. City of
Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir. 1974) (prima facie test provides proper standard
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In Smith v. Town of 9larkton,' the Fourth Circuit applied the Title
VII prima facie standard to a Title VIII suit in which a black plaintiff
alleged that Clarkton's withdrawal from a low income housing authority
discriminated against the town's minority population.24 The Smith plain-
tiff was a candidate for admittance to a proposed unit of public housing.25
The proposed housing project was part of a joint governmental venture
undertaken by the city of Clarkton, North Carolina, the Clarkton Hous-
ing Authority, and two neighboring towns, to acquire and operate low in-
come public housing in the area." The cooperative decided, after con-
sultations with the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), to construct fifty units of public housing in Clarkton.2 7 HUD ap-
proved the cooperative's application for construction and funding of the
housing units and the cooperative purchased fifteen acres of land.
28
Soon after the cooperative purchased the fifteen acre site, a number
of Clarkton residents questioned the projected need for public housing
in Clarkton.' Public sentiment adverse to the housing project led the
under Title VIII because clever men easily conceal racial motivation), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1042 (1975).
The difficulty of proving specific intent in fair housing cases arises because many
discriminatory effects stem from facially neutral actions that perpetuate the effects of past
patterns of racial discrimination. See Testers, supra note 2, at 170 n.6. For example, a re-
quirement that new tenants secure recommendations appears facially neutral, but when the
landlord imposes the requirement on black residents only, the practice perpetuates segrega-
tion. See United States v. Grooms, 348 F. Supp. 1130, 1134 (M.D. Fla. 1972). In Grooms, the
United States sought injunctive relief against the owners and operators of a mobile home
park. Id. at 1131. The complaint alleged that the defendants engaged in a pattern or practice
of housing discrimination by requiring that prospective black tenants obtain recommenda-
tions from incumbent residents of the park. Id. at 1132. The district court held that defendants'
housing policyotreated the prospective black tenants differently because the defendants ad-
mitted white tenants without demanding recommendations. Id. at 1132-33. The court
therefore ruled that the defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of housing discrimina-
tion in violation of Title VIII, Id. at 1134.
*Specific intent to discriminate is also difficult to identify because defendants can
disguise racial prejudice easily. Testers, supra note 2, at 170; Prima Facie Case, supra note
6, at 151; see U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDERSTANDING FAIR HOUSING 15-16 (1973)
(racial discrimination in United States largely hidden).
. 682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1982).
2 Id. at 1065.
Id. at 1062.
28 Id. at 1061. In Smith, Clarkton officials established the Clarkton Housing Authority
(CHA) in 1968 to secure public housing funds for the town. Id. After failing to obtain the
funds, the CHA united with the nearby towns of Bladenboro and Elizabethtown to form the
Joint Municipal Housing Cooperative (JMHC). Id.
. Id.
3 Id. The Smith court found thiat in addition to the Department of Housing and Urban
Develdpment (HUD), various federal and state agencies approved the JMHC's public hous-
ing plan. Id. Upon receiving the agencies' approval of the plan, the JMHC bought a fifteen
acre site for the housing project, hired and architect, and considered plans to survey the
site area. Id.
' Id. at 1061-62. In Smith, the public expressed opposition to the housing development
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Town Commission to withdraw Clarkton from the joint cooperative."
Town officials blocked a subsequent effort by local black residents to
build alternative low income housing in Clarkton 1 Shortly thereafter,
plaintiff Smith filed suit against the city of Clarkton and four town of-
ficials alleging violations of Title VIII and the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment.32 In the complaint, the plaintiff alleged that
community opposition to the project directly influenced the official decis-
ion to withdraw Clarkton from the housing authority." The plaintiff fur-
in various ways. A petition signed by Clarkton residents conveyed an initial display of com-
munity animus. Id. at 1061. In the petition, the town citizens requested a delay of construc-
tion on the project to allow local residents time to study the need for public housing in
Clarkton. Id. At a subsequent public hearing, citizens of Clarkton raised numerous objec-
tions to the project. Id. at 1062. At trial, the testimony of local residents revealed further
community opposition as expressed in past conversations relating to the proposed project.
Id. The last express act of community opposition occurred when a group of local taxpayers
demanded that the town commissioners conduct an opinion poll. Id.
3 Id. at 1062. To gauge public sentiment concerning the project, the town officials in
Smith conducted an opinion poll. Id. The poll showed 146 registered voters opposing the
proposed housing, while 98 favored the housing development. Id. The town commissioners
subsequently withdrew the CHA from the JMHC. Id.
" Id. at 1062-63. A group of Clarkton black residents in Smith formed the Bladen
County Improvement Association to develop low income housing in Clarkton. Id. at 1062.
The town officials opposed the project in favor of a plan the Commission devised to build 20
units of housing for the elderly and handicapped on the original fifteen acre site, with 30
units of general low income housing outside the town limits. Id.
32 Id. at 1059. Title VIII offers two alternative remedies for plaintiffs filing suit under
the statute. U.S. COMM-N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN 38 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as TWENTY YEARS]. Victims of discrimination in housing who prefer an ad-
ministrative remedy may file a written complaint with the Secretary of HUD within 180
days of the alleged discriminatory practice. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)-(b) (1976). HUD, the agency
responsible for the administration of Title VIII, then has 30 days to act on the complaint. Id.
§ 3610(a). HUD's enforcement powers include the receipt, investigation, and eventual resolu-
tion of the complaint through voluntary compliance with HUD orders. See id. §§ 3610,
3611(a); TWENTY YEARS, supra, at 38 (enforcement of HUD orders occurs mainly through
voluntary compliance). The agency has no power to request temporary or permanent injunc-
tions or restraining orders. TWENTY YEARS, supra, at 38. If HUD is unable to reconcile a
complaint, the Secretary of HUD may refer the grievance to the Justice Department, and
the United States Attorney General may proceed with litigation. Id., see 42 U.S.C. § 3611(g)
(1976) (Attorney General provision).
The aggrieved party may choose a judicial remedy as an alternative to the ad-
ministrative remedy. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA 3
(1974) (judicial and administrative remedies under Title VIII). A party may file a civil action
under Title VIII in federal court that has jurisdiction over the parties or in state courts of
general jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a) (1976). Title VIII empowers the courts to grant tem-
porary or permanent injunctions, restraining orders and any damages deemed appropriate
Id. § 3612(c).
Title VIII also empohers the United States Attorney General to bring civil actions on
his own initiative in cases involving a pattern or practice of racial discrimination, or if the
case raises an issue of general public importance. Id. § 3613. The Attorney General may ap-
ply for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or any other order he
deems necessary. Id.
' 682 F.2d at 1059. In the original complaint, the plaintiff Smith alleged violations
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ther alleged that racial bias motivated the public opposition and that the
officials acted with personal knowledge of the public bias in deciding to
block the housing project. 4
The Smith trial court held that the defendants violated Title VIII
and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment." The trial
court reasoned that the defendants' decision to withdraw Clarkton's par-
ticipation from the housing authority resulted solely from Clarkton
residents' opposition to the housing project."' The court concluded that
racial bias was the principal basis of the public's opposition to the pro-
ject and that the defendants blocked the project knowing the racial
nature of the public animus." In addition, the trial court ordered affir-
mative remedial action, requiring the defendants to take all steps
necessary to construct or cause the construction of fifty low income
housing units in Clarkton.-
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the defendants argued that the trial
court's factual findings were clearly erroneous, including the determina-
tion that improper discriminatory motives prompted the defendant's ac-
tion." In addition, the defendants argued that even if the trial court cor-
under various statutes protecting his right to the full and equal benefit of all United States
laws and providing for civil actions by United States citizens for deprivation of rights
secured by law. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) (minority persons within jurisdiction of
United States have full and equal benefit of all laws enjoyed by white citizens); 42 U.S.C. §
1982 (all minority United States citizens have same rights as white citizens to purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property). The Smith trial court granted the
plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to allege jurisdiction under Title VIII. 682 F.2d at
1059; see 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a) (1976) (jurisdiction of courts under Title VIII). The court later
dismissed the claims based on §§ 1981 and 1982. 682 F.2d at 1059 n.1. Since the plaintiff
chose not to appeal the dismissal, the Fourth Circuit did not address the dismissal. Id.
682 F.2d at 1059; see supra notes 28 & 29 (public opposition to housing project and
defendants' decision to withdraw Clarkton from JMHC).
- 682 F.2d at 1059; see 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1976) (unlawful to refuse to sell or rent dwell-
ing to any person because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin).
682 F.2d at 1063.
Id.; see supra notes 29 & 30 (evidence of public opposition and opinion poll).
682 F.2d at 1067. In addition to requiring the defendants' in Smith to take all steps
necessary to construct the housing units, the Smith trial court ordered the defendants to
rescind the Town Commissioners' action withdrawing the CHA from the JMHC. Id. The
trial court also ordered the defendants to rescind the Town Commissioners' action approv-
ing plans to build twenty units of elderly and handicapped housing in Clarkton. Id. The trial
court then instructed the defendants to take affirmative steps to facilitate the construction
of the housing units by one or more methods, such as reinstating Clarkton in the JMHC, re-
quiring the CHA to construct the fifty units, or requiring the defendants to construct the
housing units themselves. Id.
Id. at 1064; see FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (appellate courts may reverse factual findings
only if clearly erroneous). The defendants alleged that the trial court, in making its factual
determinations, erred in admitting certain evidence that was irrelevant and prejudicial or
hearsay under the Federal Rules of Evidence. 682 F.2d at 1064; see FED. R. EvID. 402, 403,
802 (exclusion of irrelevant, prejudicial or hearsay evidence). The defendants also asserted
that the trial court erred in allowing the plaintiff to amend the complaint five weeks before
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rectly determined the defendants' liability for obstructing the construc-
tion of the public housing with discriminatory intent, the trial court
seriously erred in devising the remedial action."
The Fourth Circuit held that the trial court's factual findings were
not clearly erroneous.4 The Smith court reasoned that the facts adduced
at trial clearly demonstrated violations of Title VIII and the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment.4' In considering the Title
VIII violation, the Fourth Circuit held that the prima facie concept,
employed by courts in Title VII cases, applies to Title VIII violations.4"
The Fourth Circuit cited Third and Seventh Circuit decisions in which
the trial. 682 F.2d at 1059. The defendants argued the amendment violated Title VIII's 180
day statute of limitations. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a).
' 682 F.2d at 1060; see supra text accompanying note 38 (district court ordered affirm-
ative remedial action). The defendants alleged that the trial court's order exceeded the
traditional scope of equity powers because the defendants had no statutory or constitutional
duty to provide low income housing. 682 F.2d at 1067.
"' 682 F.2d at 1064. The Smith court noted that the case record amply supported the
trial court's factual findings. Id. at 1060. The Fourth Circuit also held that the district court
did not err in admitting the contested testimony at trial. Id. at 1064; see supra note 39
(defendant's relevance and hearsay arguments). Moreover, the Smith court held that even
if the trial court had admitted the testimony erroneously, the error was harmless under
Federal Rule of Evidence 103. 682 F.2d at 1064; see FED. R. EVID. 103 (ruling that admits or
excludes evidence only erroneous if ruling affects substantial right of parties). In upholding
the trial court's factual findings, the Fourth Circuit-emphasized that discrimination cases in-
volving evidence of the defendant's motive and intent require cautious evaluation by the
courts. 682 F.2d at 1064. The Smith court noted that the difficulty plaintiffs encounter in
providing evidence of specific intent to discriminate arises because individuals acting from
invidious motives seldom make open statements of discriminatory intent. Id. The Fourth
Circuit held that the trial record in Smith presented more direct evidence revealing the
motives behind the defendants' conduct than usually appears in racial discrimination cases.
Id. at 1065.
The Smith court also held that the original complaint alleged facts sufficient to state a
claim under either the fourteenth amendment or Title VIII. Id. at 1060. The Smith court
employed the liberal amendment policies of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) (Rule
15(a)) and held that the plaintiffs complaint supported an alternative claim of relief under
Title VIII. Id. at 1059-60; see FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Rule 15(a) states that courts have broad
discretion to allow amendment of the plaintiff's pleadings when justice requires. Id.; see
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (Rule 15(a) allows amendment of plaintiffs
pleadings when justice requires and facts plaintiff relied on in pleadings constitute proper
grounds of relief); Bamm, Inc. v. GAF Corp., 651 F.2d 389, 391 (5th Cir. 1981) (review of trial
court's decision to grant leave to amend entailed determination of whether trial court
abused discretion). The Fourth Circuit in Smith employed the relation back provision of
Rule 15(c) to satisfy Title VIII's statute of limitations. 682 F.2d at 1060; see FED. R. Civ. P.
15(c) (when claim in amended complaint arose out of transaction set forth in original com-
plaint, amendment relates back to date of original pleading); see 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a) (1976)
(civil actions under Title VIII must commence within 180 days of alleged discriminatory
housing practice).
" 682 F.2d at 1065-66; see 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1976) (refusal to rent or sell a dwelling
because of race or color violates Title VIII); U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (equal protection
clause).
" 682 F.2d at 1065; see supra text accompanying notes 14-17 (prima facie standard).
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the courts had employed the prima facie concept in Title VIII cases
because of the common goals of both Titles VII and VIII." The Fourth
Circuit also employed the four-prong test the Seventh Circuit adopted in
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation v. Village of Arlington
Heights5 (Arlington IP) to determine whether the defendant's conduct
produced discriminatory effects sufficient to violate Title VIII.46 The Ar-
lington H court premised its analysis on the theory that not all dis-
criminatory effects are illegal.4" The four factors that determine when
conduct with a discriminatory effect constitutes a violation of the Act in-
clude the strength of the plaintiffs showing of discrimination, a showing
of the defendant's intent, the interest of the defendant in the challenged
action, and the nature of the relief sought by the plaintiff."
Applying the Arlington 11 test to the events in Smith, the Fourth
Circuit held that the plaintiff made a strong showing of the discrim-
" 682 F.2d at 1065. In support of the application of the prima facie test to Title VIII,
the Smith court relied on the precedent of the Seventh and the Third Circuits. Id.; see
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights (Arlington 11), 558 F.2d 1283,
1289-90 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); Residents Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo,
564 F.2d 126, 146-48 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); infra notes 65-78 and ac-
companying text (discussion of Arlington II and Rizzo).
'5 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
'6 682 F.2d at 1065-66; see infra text accompanying note 48 (Arlington II test).
558 F.2d at 1290. The Arlington 11 court emphasized that courts should not find
every action that produces a discriminatory effect illegal because a per se rule would exceed
the intent of Congress in passing Title VIII. Id. The Seventh Circuit recommended that
courts use their discretion and evaluate Title VIII relief on a case-by-case basis. Id.
11 558 F.2d at 1290. The Arlington II court, in devising a four-prong test for measuring
the defendant's burden of justification, outlined each of the four factors separately. Id. at
1290-93. Addressing the first factor, which requires a showing of discriminatory effect, the
court identified two kinds of racially discriminatory effects that a facially neutral decision
about housing may produce. Id. at 1290-91. One type of discriminatory effect occurs when
the defendant's facially neutral decision adversely impacts one racial group more than
another. Id. at 1290. Another type of discriminatory effect occurs when the defendant's decis-
ion prevents interracial association in the community. Id. at 1290-91.
Considering the second factor, which requires some showing of intent, the Arlington II
court noted that the plaintiff may provide evidence of the defendant's intent without
meeting the constitutional standard of intent required under equal protection claims. Id.;
see infra text accompanying notes 74-76 (constitutional intent standard). The Arlington II
court concluded that the intent factor was the least important of the four factors in the test.
558 F.2d at 1292. The court reasoned that judicial emphasis on purposeful discrimination
forces courts to rely on a conjectural inference that the defendant acted with bad intent. Id.
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit considered that the problems involved in acquiring con-
clusive proof of discriminatory intent exist even when the plaintiff seeks to develop only
partial evidence of intent. Id.
Addressing the third factor, which requires a showing of the defendant's interest in
taking the challenged action, the Arlington II court considered three types of defendants.
Id. at 1293. When the defendant is a private group or individual, the Seventh Circuit
asserted that courts must undertake a rigorous examination of the defendants' interests
when the discriminatory effect serves to perpetuate segregation. Id. For similar reasons,
the Arlington II court considered a critical judicial examination appropriate when the
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inatory effects of the defendant's conduct. 49 In addition, the Smith court
held that the plaintiff proved the racial motivation behind the public op-
position to the housing project. 0 The Fourth Circuit further ruled that
the defendants had no legitimate justification for the decision to
withdraw Clarkton from the proposed project."1 Applying the last factor
of the Arlington test, the Fourth Circuit noted that the plaintiff sought
only to restore the status quo regarding the construction of low income
housing in Clarkton 2 The Smith court concluded that, under the Ar-
lington 11 test, the discriminatory effects the defendants' conduct pro-
duced were significant enough to establish a Title VIII violation. 3
Addressing the defendant's argument concerning the scope of the
trial court's equity powers, the Fourth Circuit modified the portion of the
trial court's remedial order requiring Clarkton to construct or cause the
construction of fifty units of public housing. 4 The Fourth Circuit stated
that, as a general proposition, courts have broad and flexible equitable
powers to fashion remedies that correct past wrongs.' The Smith court
held that in Title VIII violation cases broad remedial powers stemmed
from the congressional intent underlying the statute. 6 The Fourth Cir-
defendant is a governmental body acting outside the scope of its authority. Id. When the
defendant is a governmental body zacting within the scope of legitimately derived authority,
however, the court called for a higher degree of judicial deference. Id.
Concerning the final factor, the nature of the relief sough by the plaintiff, the court
drew a distinction between cases in which a plaintiff attempts to force municipal defendants
to provide housing for minorities and cases in which the plaintiff seeks to prevent the defend-
ant from interfering with the plaintiff's attempt to build integrated housing. Id. The court
noted that to require a municipal defendant to appropriate money, land, and manpower to
provide integrated housing is a massive judicial intrusion on governmental autonomy. Id.
The Seventh Circuit reasoned, therefore, that courts should be more reluctant to grant af-
firmative relief than to restrain the defendant's inference with the plaintiffs private plans
for integrated housing. Id.
'1 682 F.2d at 1065-66. The Smith court, in assessing the discriminatory effects of the
defendants' conduct, relied on statistical evidence that the defendants' decision to terminate
the housing project primarily affected the black residents of the Clarkton area. Id. at 1065.
The evidence showed that the black population was the group most in need of new construc-
tion to replace substandard housing and the group with the highest percentage of presump-
tively eligible applicants. Id.
Id. at 1065; see supra text accompanying note 37 (district court held that racial basis
motivated public opposition to housing project).
SI 682 F.2d 1065; see supra text accompanying note 3 (district court finding that racial
bias was principle basis of public opposition to project).
1 682 F.2d at 1065. The Fourth Circuit noted that the modified trial court remedial
order restored the parties to the positions they occupied before the Title VIII violation oc-
curred. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 54-62 (Fourth Circuit modification of trial
court's remedial order).
' 682 F.2d at 1066; see supra text accompanying notes 45-48 (Arlington II test).
" 682 F.2d at 1070; see supra text accompanying note 38 (district court's remedial order).
682 F.2d at 1068; see Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15
(1971) (scope of district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad).
1 682 F.2d at 1068; see supra note 3 (purpose of Title VIII is to provide fair housing).
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cuit noted a limitation, however, on the courts' power to devise Title
VIII remedies. 7 The Fourth Circuit held that when a judicial remedy in-
terferes with the normal functioning of local government to an excessive
degree, the court has exceeded its remedial powers under Title VIII.6 In
Smith the Fourth Circuit approved that part of the trial court's order
which required the defendants to take affirmative steps to reinstate the
housing plans.59 The Fourth Circuit concluded, however, that the trial
court exceeded its equity powers in requiring Clarkton to construct and
maintain the housing units." The Fourth Circuit noted that the town of-
ficials had acted in good faith to seek better housing for the town's
residents." The town officials' good faith actions, considered with the
town's limited resources, convinced the Fourth Circuit that the trial
court's order disproportionately intruded into local government func-
tions.2
Although the Fourth Circuit previously considered a Title VIII case
under an implied intent standard,' the Smith decision marks the first
time the Fourth Circuit has employed the Title VII prima facie standard
in Title VIII litigation. The Fourth Circuit's application of the prima
facie standard is consistent with decisions of the Second, Third, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. 4 One of the most important
", 682 F.2d at 1069.
'Id.
' Id.; see supra note 38 (trial court's remedial order).
682 F.2d at 1069.
61 Id.
6 Id. at 1069-70. The Smith court cautioned that the defendants' future interference
with or disregard for the modified court order could justify an affirmative order requiring
the defendants to construct the housing from town resources. Id. at 1069.
' See Madison v. Jeffers, 494 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1974). In Madison, the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant property owner racially discriminated in refusing to sell land
because the plaintiff was black. Id. at 115. The defendant asserted tax reasons for the
refusal to sell the property. Id. at 116. The Fourth Circuit concluded that because the plain-
tiff did not produce evidence of racial bias on the part of the defendant, the trial court's
holding that the defendant did not violate Title VIII was not clearly erroneous. Id. at 116-17.
" See, e.g., Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1331 (9th Cir. 1982) (significant
discriminatory effects flowing from rental decisions demonstrate a violation of Title VIII);
United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562, 576 (6th Cir. 1981) (trial court complied with
proper legal standards in deciding city violated Title VIII because municipal zoning or-
dinance had discriminatory effects), cert. denied, - U.S. -_, 102 S. Ct. 1972, reh. denied,
- U.S. - , 102 S. Ct. 2308 (1982); United States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789, 791 (5th Cir.
1978) (Title VIII prohibits direct discrimination and practices with discriminatory effects);
Wharton v. Knefel, 562 F.2d 550, 555 (8th Cir. 1977) (prima facie standard governs Title VIII
cases); Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1976) (concept of prima facie
case applies to housing discrimination cases under Title VIII); see also infra text accompany-
ing notes 65-78 (Seventh and Third Circuit Courts held that discriminatory effects violated
Title VIII).
The Second Circuit recently decided that proof of discriminatory effects is sufficient to
establish a Title VIII claim. See Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d
Cir. 1979) (prima facie case proper standard under Title VIII). The Robinson decision con-
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cases holding a Title VIII defendant to a discriminatory effects standard
is the Seventh Circuit's decision in Arlington 11.5 The Arlington II court
held that proof of discriminatory effects alone constitutes a prima facie
violation of Title VIII 6 The Seventh Circuit then applied a four-part test
to determine whether the defendant's conduct actually violated Title
VIII 7 The Seventh Circuit's analysis emphasized the common purpose
of Titles VII and VIII to end discrimination. 8 The Arlington I1 court also
noted that the prohibitory language of both statutes is almost identical. 9
The Seventh Circuit concluded, on the basis of its comparison of the two
tradicts an earlier Second Circuit decision holding that proof of a civil rights statutory viola-
tion requires the plaintiff to make a showing of discriminatory intent. See Boyd v. Lefrak
Org., 509 F.2d 1110, 1113 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 896 (1975). In Boyd, the plaintiff
welfare recipients brought a class action on behalf of all New York City welfare recipients,
who claimed that the defendant landlords' rental policies prevented them from renting any
of the defendants' apartments. Id. at 1111. The defendants' challenged rental policy re-
quired applicants for apartments to have weekly net income equal to at least 90% of the
monthly rent of the unit desired. Id. The plaintiffs claimed that the effect of the 90% rule
was racially discriminatory and violated Title VIII. Id. The Boyd court rejected the plain-
tiffs' claim, holding that proof of discriminatory effect was inappropriate in private actions
asserting discrimination in housing. Id. The Boyd court held in dictum, however, that proof
of discriminatory effect was applicable in equal protection claims challenging government
action. Id.
The Boyd decision has limited precedential value because of the Robinson holding.
Boyd also is inapplicable in Title VIII cases because the court failed to distinguish constitu-
tional from statutory standards. See 509 F.2d at 1111 (Boyd court held that plaintiffs may
establish constitutional claims of discrimination by proving discriminatory effect). In
holding that equal protection claims may be decided by a showing of discriminatory effect,
the Boyd court directly contradicted the Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Davis
that requires plaintiffs to show the defendants' discriminatory intent under equal protection
claims. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (proof of discriminatory intent
necessary to establish constitutional claim of racial discrimination); infra text accompanying
notes 74-76 (Davis discussion).
6 Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
6 558 F.2d at 1290.
"7 Id.; see supra text accompanying note 48 (Arlington II four-part test).
558 F.2d at 1289. The Arlington II court's analysis of Title VII and Title VIII focused
on the Supreme Court's treatment of Title VIII cases. Id. at 1288-89. The Seventh Circuit
noted that the Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Davis establishing an intent stand-
ard for equal protection cases did not affect the plaintiff's ability to establish a Title VII
prima facie case of employment discrimination by evidence of discriminatory impact alone.
Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 75 & 76 (Washington v. Davis decision). Reviewing
Supreme Court decisions relating to Title VII, the Seventh Circuit noted that the Court con-
strued Title VII broadly to effectuate the congressional purpose of ending discriminatory
employment practices. Id. at 1289. Employing the same approach, the Arlington 11 court
recognized the need to construe Title VIII broadly to implement the congressional goal of
ending discrimination in housing. Id.
9 558 F.2d at 1289. The Arlington II court's analysis of the language of Title VII and
Title VIII focused on the "because of race" phrase in both statutes. Id. The Seventh Circuit
noted that the Supreme Court did not consider the "because of race" language in Title VII
sufficient for the Court to impose an intent standard, and concluded that the same language
in Title VIII did not preclude a discriminatory effects standard under Title VIII. Id. at 1289
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statutes, that a showing of discriminatory intent is not necessary to
establish a Title VIII violation and that the defendant's conduct produced
discriminatory effects sufficient to prove a violation. 0
The Third Circuit adopted the prima facie standard for Title VIII
litigation in Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo.7' In Rizzo, the Third Cir-
cuit accepted the Seventh Circuit's decision in Arlington 11 which held
that a demonstration of discriminatory effect alone may establish a viola-
tion of Title VIII.72 The Rizzo court specifically noted that the Seventh
Circuit decided the Title VIII issue on remand from the Supreme Court's
decision in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp. (Arlington B)." In Arlington 1, the Supreme Court ordered the
Seventh Circuit to reconsider the appellate court's prior holding that
discriminatory effects violated the equal protection clause in light of the
Supreme Court decision in Washington v..Davis." In Davis, the Supreme
Court held that a plaintiff must show that the defendant intentionally
discriminated to prove a violation of the equal protection clause of the
United States Constitution. 5 The Court distinguished constitutional
claims from statutory proscriptions of discrimination, stating that con-
stitutional claims require proof of intent while antidiscrimination
statutes do not require proof of discriminatory purpose." In Rizzo, the
Third Circuit reasoned that the Davis decision in effect held that Title
VIII standards did not require proof of discriminatory intent." The
Third Circuit also stated that the similar language of Titles VII and VIII
and the statutes' common purpose supported the court's use of the
discriminatory effects standard in Title VIII litigation."8
70 Id. at 1289-90. The Arlington II court noted the difficulty of proving discriminatory
intent stems from the fact that persons with intent to discriminate keep their purpose hid-
den to conform with the public distaste for overtly bigoted behavior. Id. at 1290.
", 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978). The Rizzo case began
when various individuals eligible for low income housing sued the City of Philadelphia, city
agencies, and certain city officials. Id. at 129. In the complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant's failure to permit construction of a planned low income housing project violated
Title VIII. Id. at 129-30. The district court held that the city agencies had violated Title VIII
because the agencies' actions produced a discriminatory effect. Id. at 146.
72 Id. at 148.
7' Id. at 147; see Village of Arlington Heights v Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 271 (1977) (Supreme Court reversed and remanded Seventh Circuit's decision).
" 429 U.S. at 268; see Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights,
517 F.2d 409, 415 (7th Cir. 1975) (Seventh Circuit holding that discriminatory effects
violated plaintiff's constitutional rights); infra notes 73-74 (Washington v. Davis decision).
5 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
(equal protection clause).
78 426 U.S. at 238-41.
564 F.2d at 147. The Rizzo court reasoned that if the same intent standard applied to
Title VIII as to equal protection cases, the Supreme Court would have decided the Title
VIII issue immediately instead of wasting judicial resources by remanding the case to the
Seventh Circuit. Id.
" 564 F.2d at 147-48. In analyzing the statutory language of Titles VII and VIII, the Rizzo
court agreed with the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that the "because of race" language in
the statutes does not require proof of intentional discrimination. Id. at 147; see supra note
1983]
628 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
Defendants in Title VIII cases bear the burden of justifying prac-
tices that produce discriminatory effects. 9 The courts have disagreed
about how to assess the defendant's justification. ° In Smith, the Fourth
Circuit adopted the Seventh Circuit's four-part Arlington I1 test.8 The
Eighth Circuit on the other hand employed the business necessity test,
first developed by the courts in Title VII employment discrimination
cases involving a private party defendant.82 Courts using the Title VII
business necessity test state that once a plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case of discrimination, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant
to show that the challenged practice arises for a legitimate business
reason. 3 The Eighth Circuit, however, joined the Second Circuit in
employing the compelling governmental interest test when dealing with
a municipal defendant.84 Under the compelling governmental 'interest
standard, the court must determine whether the challenged practice in
fact furthers the defendant's interests. 5 Courts applying the compelling
governmental interest standard must determine whether the local
governmental interest served is constitutionally permissible and
whether less drastic means of achieving the goal exist.86 In Rizzo, the
69 (Seventh Circuit analysis of statutory language). The Rizzo court then examined Title
VIII's legislative history and determined that the congressional purpose in enacting Title
VIII was to eliminate discriminatory effects of past and present prejudice in housing. 564
F.2d at 147. The Rizzo court noted that congressional intent requires courts to construe Ti-
tle VIII broadly. Id. The Rizzo court also noted that the Supreme Court recognized the need
to construe both Title VII and Title VIII broadly to end discrimination. Id.; see supra note 4
(Supreme Court reads Title VIII broadly); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30
(1971) (Court read Title VII broadly).
" See United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1055 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (defend-
ant must justify challenged conduct), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 102 S. Ct. 1972, reh.
denied, __ U.S. __, 102 S. Ct. 2308 (1982).
" See Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1311 (9th Cir. 1982) (circuit courts have
applied different standards in determining importance of discriminatory effect).
" See supra text accompanying notes 49-53 (Fourth Circuit application of Arlington II
test in Smith to determine defendant's burden of justification).
"2 See Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 827 (8th Cir.) (when- plaintiff establishes
prima facie case of discrimination, burden shifts to defendant to articulate some legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for challenged practice), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1027 (1974).
" See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). If the defendant successfully
rebuts the prima facie case, then the plaintiff assumes the burden of demonstrating a Title
VII violation by showing that an alternative employment practice is possible that is less dis-
criminatory and that meets the employer's legitimate concerns. Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
' See United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179,1186 (8th Cir. 1974) (if plain-
tiff establishes prima facie case, burden shifts to municipality to show compelling govern-
ment interest), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1976); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of
Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 1970) (municipal defendant has burden to show com-
pelling government interest after plaintiff establishes prima facie case), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 1010 (1971).
508 F.2d at 1186-87.
Id. The compelling governmental interest test usually arises in cases involving equal
protection challenges to statutes or ordinances creating suspect classifications or impinging
on fundamental rights. Id. at 1185 n.4.
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Third Circuit held that the defendant's burden of justifying discrimi-
natory effects must be measured on a case-by-case basis. 7
The Fourth Circuit, by applying the Arlington II test, ignored the
test's deficiencies.' The Arlington II test does not recognize the
possibility that the defendant's interests could be rooted in legitimate
public policy. Although the Arlington II analysis allows courts to
distinguish between public and private defendants, the test fails to
evaluate the legitimacy of the defendants' interests or to consider the
availability of alternative measures. 9 For instance, a public defendant's
discriminatory zoning decision may rest on legitimate considerations of
public health and safety." Another deficiency of Arlington II test is its
failure to explain whether courts should weigh all factors equally or
whether some factors deserve greater consideration. 1 The Arlington II
court indicated that courts should decide in the plaintiffs favor when
11 See 564 F.2d 126, 149 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978). The Rizzo court
disapproved of the Arlington II, the business necessity, and the compelling governmental
interest tests employed by other circuit courts. Id. at 148. The Rizzo court distinguished the
compelling governmental interest test because the test normally arises in equal protection
cases that require a showing of purposeful intent by the plaintiff. Id. The Rizzo court noted
that requiring a Title VII defendant to justify a challenged action by proving a compelling
governmental interest places too great a burden on the defendant. Id. The Third Circuit
also decided that the business necessity test was unacceptable in Title VIII cases. Id. The
court noted that Title VII criteria for measuring the defendant's justification for a
discriminatory employment practice is easier for courts to define and analyze than any
justification of discriminatory housing practices under Title VIII. Id. The Rizzo Court
distinguished the Arlington II test by suggesting that the Arlington II test applied to a
court's determination of a prima facie violation of Title VIII rather than to the determina-
tion of the defendant's burden of justification. Id. at n.32. The Rizzo court concluded that
the problem of measuring the defendant's justification requires a case-by-case approach. Id.
at 149. As guidance for lower courts, the Rizzo court stated that the Title VIII defendant
rebuts a prima facie case of housing discrimination only by showing some legitimate in-
terest in the challenged action. Id. The Rizzo court further stated that the defendant must
demonstrate that no alternative course of conduct exists that satisfies the defendant's
legitimate interest without producing a discriminatory effect. Id.
' See Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065-66 (4th Cir. 1982) (Fourth Circuit
application of Arlington II test); Last Stand, supra note 18, at 170 (Arlington II test is defi-
cient in a number of respects); Proper Standard, supra note 17, at 410-11 (Arlington II test
suffers from defects).
" See Last Stand, supra note 17, at 175-76 (Arlington 1I court failed to consider
municipal defendant's justifications for decision to deny rezoning petition); Proper Standard,
supra note 17, at 411 (third and fourth factors of Arlington 1I test fail to evaluate the
strength of the defendant's interests).
" See Last Stand, supra note 18, at 176 (zoning decisions may be legitimate exercise of
local police power). Municipalities traditionally have broad powers to promote the health
and safety of the community through zoning ordinances. Id. A court infringes upon
municipal authority in zoning matters when the court invalidates a zoning decision under Ti-
tle VIII without evaluating the defendant's justification for the action. Id.
"' See Schwemm, supra note 3, at 257 (Seventh Circuit in Arlington 11 failed to explain
how courts should weigh four factors); Last Stand, supra note 18, at 170 (Arlington II court
did not explain whether four factors weigh equally or whether some should play a greater
role); Proper Standard, supra note 17, at 413 (weakness of Arlington 11 test is court's con-
sideration of number of factors supporting each party and not weight of factors).
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two of the four factors support the plaintiffs assertion. 2 Deciding all
two-two splits in plaintiffs favor, however, would seem inevitably to pro-
duce unfair results.
9 3
The business necessity test is arguably a more appropriate tool for
assessing the defendant's burden of justification in Smith.4 In addition
to requiring courts to determine whether the challenged practice arises
from a legitimate business interest,95 the business necessity test re-
quires the courts to consider the possibility of alternative practices. 6
Thus, the business necessity test corrects the deficiencies of the Arling-
ton 11 test,97 while providing courts with a well-defined framework for
analyzing the defendant's burden of justification.
The Smith court's affirmation of the trial court's order that the
defendants take affirmative steps to reinstate the Clarkton housing pro-
ject is consistent with precedent holding that affirmative action re-
quirements in Title VIII remedial orders are proper. The Seventh Cir-
92 See 558 F.2d at 1294.
See Proper Standard, supra note 17, at 413 (Arlington 11 text may produce unfair
results). Ideally, courts using the Arlington II test should decide some two-two splits in
favor of the plaintiff and some in favor of the defendant, depending upon the relative
weights of the factors. Id.
9' See supra text accompanying note 83 (business necessity test).
" See Prima Facie Case, supra note 6, at 176 (business necessity test requires defend-
ant to prove that challenged practice stems from legitimate business practice). The weight
of the burden on the Title VII defendant to justify his action varies according to the case. Id.
Most courts agree, however, that the defendant bears the burden of coming forward
with convincing evidence that the challenged practice is consistent with the asserted
justification. See Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 732 (1st Cir. 1972) (defendant must show
convincing relationship between challenged practice and asserted justification). Under Title
VIII, the defendant should try to demonstrate that the challenged housing practice
legitimately seeks to achieve the asserted justification. Prima Facie Case, supra note 6, at
176-77; see Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 827-28 (8th Cir. 1974). In Williams, the
Eighth Circuit held that the defendant developer's policy of selling lots only to approved
white builders resulted in a discriminatory effect that violated Title VIII. Id. at 826. The
Eighth Circuit employed the business necessity test to hold that the defendant failed to'
justify the challenged practice. Id. at 828. The Williams court held that the defendant's
assertions that the practice was unbiased did not overcome the prima facie case of
discrimination. Id. at 828.
" See supra note 83 (plaintiff bears burden of demonstrating alternative practices ex-
ist); Last Stand, supra note 17, at 178. One proposed balancing test is very similar to the Ti-
tle VII business necessity test. Id. Under the proposed test, the Title VIII plaintiff will bear
the burden of establishing the discriminatory effect. Id. at 179. When the plaintiff meets
that burden, the burden will shift to the defendant to show that the practice served a
legitimate interest. Id. The proposed test then will divide between the plaintiff and defend-
ant the burden of suggesting reasonable alternatives. Id. The test differs from the Title VII
standard by requiring the plaintiff to meet a minimum discriminatory effects threshold
before the burden of justification shifts to the defendant, Id. The test also differs from the
Title VII business necessity standard because the test allows the defendant to justify the
challenged practice by demonstrating a broader range of legitimate interests than simply
the safety or efficiency concerns relevant in Title VII employment cases. Id. at 180.
" See supra text accompanying notes 88-93 (discussion of Arlington I1 deficiencies).
" See 682 F.2d at 1069; infra text accompanying notes 98-104 (courts' approval of affir-
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cuit has held that a district court's remedial powers include the power to
order a municipal defendant to identify a parcel of land suitable for low-
cost housing within the city.9 The Seventh Circuit recognized that ap-
pellate courts regularly have provided affirmative relief from
discriminatory land use practices employed by municipal defendants."'
Like the Fourth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit noted that authority for af-
firmative relief stems from the broad language of Title VIII that
justifies all measures necessary to protect federal rights and implement
federal policies. 1 ' Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has held that district
courts may impose affirmative action relief on municipal defendants,
such as requiring the defendants to attend joint conferences with the
plaintiffs to seek a mutually acceptable housing plan.'' The Eighth Cir-
cuit held that the purpose of Title VIII, to promote integrated housing,
authorized the court to fashion comprehensive affirmative relief designed
to eliminate discriminatory effects. 3 The Third and Sixth Circuits also
have approved affirmative relief in Title VIII cases.'
The Fourth Circuit's decision to modify the scope of the trial court's
order, in recognition of the limitations on a court in ordering remedial
relief, is consistent with Fourth Circuit precedent. In United States v..
Warwick Mobile Homes Estates, Inc.,0' the Fourth Circuit reviewed the
district court's issuance of an injunction restraining the defendant from
practicing discriminatory policies in the rental of mobile homes.' The
Fourth Circuit held that the district court properly issued injunctive
relief, but also noted that courts should not order remedial relief that is
mative remedial relief); see also Otero v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1125 (2d Cir.
1972) (courts may order municipal defendants to take affirmative action to correct violation
of fair housing statute).
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights (Arlington 111), 616
F.2d 1006, 1011 (7th Cir. 1980).
1o Id. The Arlington III court noted that the relief granted by the Seventh Circuit is a
common remedy awarded by courts in exclusionary zoning cases. Id. The remedy, known as
"site-specific relief," serves to open up particular parcels of land to low-income housing. Id.
"I Id.; see supra text accompanying note 59 (Fourth Circuit upheld affirmative relief
under Title VIII).
I" Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack (Black Jack II1), 605 F.2d 1033, 1040
(8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 905 (1980).
11 Id. at 1036, see supra note 3 (purpose of Title VIII is to encourage integrated hous-
ing).
"0 See Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 149'50 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 908 (1978) (district court had power to order affirmative relief in Title VIII cases);
United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562, 577 (6th Cir. 1981) (Sixth Circuit explicitly ap-
proved use of affirmative provisions in Title VIII cases)..
"I' United States v. Warwick Mobile Homes Estates, Inc., 588 F.2d 194, 197 (4th Cir.
1977).
11 Id. at 197. The Warwick court asserted that courts determining injunctive relief
under racial discrimination cases must determine if the defendant is likely to persist in
employing discriminatory practices. Id. The Warwick court then noted that the relevant
factors for the courts to consider are the bona fide intentions of the defendant, the termina-
tion of discriminatory practices, and the character of past violations. Id.
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overly burdensome to the defendant."7 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit
denied the plaintiffs request for further affirmative relief, holding that
the limited nature of the defendant's past violations and the unlikely
event of recurrent violations rendered any further relief unnecessary. 10 8 In
modifying the remedial order in Smith, the Fourth Circuit also con-
sidered the limited nature of the town officials' violation and assumed
that the defendants would in good faith observe the district court's
remedial order.'0 9
The Smith court's decision to limit the trial court's order also is con-
sistent with Eighth and Sixth Circuit precedent."0 The Eighth Circuit
has recognized that federal courts must carefully tailor equitable relief
to be no more intrusive on governmental functions than is necessary to
remedy proved statutory violations."' Like the Fourth Circuit, the
Eighth Circuit has held that a district court fashioning remedial relief
must consider the municipal defendant's duty to seek out and make land
sites available for low-cost housing without requiring the defendant city
to build the housing."2 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has noted that courts
must carefully tailor the remedy in cases of statutory violations to
award only the relief necessary to correct the violations."' In United
States v. City of Parma,"' the Sixth Circuit modified a portion of the
district court's order requiring the city of Parma to ensure the construc-
tion of a specific number of low income housing units each year."' Like
the Fourth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit recognized that the ultimate
burden of providing low income housing rests with the housing develop-
ment community and that requiring the defendant to ensure a particular
number of units each year establishes an unreasonably burdensome
obligation."'
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Smith is an important addition to
107 Id. at 197-98.
' Id. at 198. The Warwick court noted that its decision might have been different if
the court had considered a case of consistent and extreme discrimination with a strong
possibility the defendant would violate the Act in the future. Id. at 198.
" See 682 F.2d at 1069. In modifying the district court order, the Smith court noted
that the defendants originally made a good faith effort to seek better housing in Clarkton.
Id. The Fourth Circuit cautioned, however, that if the defendants attempted to circumvent
the requirements of the district court's order, the district court would be justified in impos-
ing a more wide-ranging judicial intrusion into Clarkton's local affairs. Id.
11 See infra text accompanying notes 110-16 (Eighth and Sixth Circuit precedent).
I Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack (Black Jack l1), 605 F.2d 1033, 1040
(8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 905 (1980).
"' Id. The Black Jack III court noted that the municipal defendant did not have the
means to build the low cost housing entirely on its own. Id.
"' United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562, 576 (6th Cir. 1981).
114 Id.
"I Id. at 577-78. In a court order, the Parma district court had required that the defend-
ant provide at least 133 units of low-income housing each year. Id. at 577.
"'0 Id. at 578; see supra text accompanying notes 59-62 (Fourth Circuit held portion of
trial court's remedial order too burdensome on defendants).
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